Ch. 17
How to apply general principles to particular cases.
What is the first business of one who studies
philosophy? To part with self-conceit. For
it is impossible for any one to begin to learn what he
thinks that he already knows. We all go to the philosophers, talking at random upon negative and positive duties; good and evil; fair and base. We praise,
censure, accuse; we judge and dispute about fair and
base enterprises. And yet for what do we go to the
philosophers? To learn what we suppose ourselves
not to know. And what is this? Propositions. We
are desirous to hear what the philosophers say, for its
elegance and acuteness; and some with a view only
to gain. Now it is ridiculous to suppose that a person will learn anything but what he desires to learn;
or make an improvement, in what he does not learn.
But most are deceived, in the same manner as Theopompus, the orator, when he blames Plato for defining everything. "For," he says, "did none of us, before you, use the words 'good' and 'just;' or did we
utter them as empty sounds, without understanding
what each of them meant?" Why, who tells you,
Theopompus, that we had not natural ideas and general principles as to each of these? But it is not possible to apply principles in detail, without having
minutely distinguished them, and examined what details appertain to each. You may make the same objection to the physicians. For who of us did not use
the words 'wholesome' and 'unwholesome,' before
Hippocrates was born; or did we utter them as empty
sounds? For we have some general conception of
what is wholesome too, but we cannot apply it.
Hence one says, let the patient abstain from meat;
another, give it to him. One says, let him be bled;
another, cup him. And what is the reason, but not
being able to adapt the general conception of whole-
someness to particular cases? Thus, too, in life; who
of us does not talk of good or evil, advantageous and
disadvantageous; for who of us has not a general conception of each of these? But is it then a distinct
and perfect one? Show me this.
" How shall I show it? "
Apply it properly in detail. Plato, to go no further, puts definitions under the general head of useful; but you, under that of useless. Can both of
you be right? How is it possible? Again, does not
one man adapt the general conception of good to
riches; another not to riches, but to pleasure or
health? In general, unless we who use words employ
them vaguely, or without proper care in discrimination, why do we differ? Why do we wrangle? Why
do we censure each other? But what occasion have I
to mention this mutual contradiction? If you yourself apply your principles properly, how comes it to
pass that you do not prosper? Why do you meet
with any hindrance? Let us for the present omit
our second point concerning the pursuits and the
duties relative to them; let us omit the third too,
concerning assent. I waive all these for you. Let
us insist only on the first,35 which affords almost a
sensible proof that you do not properly apply your
principles. You desire what is possible in itself, and
possible for you. Why then are you hindered? Why
are you not in a prosperous way? You do not shrink
from the inevitable. Why then do you incur anything
undesirable? Why are you unfortunate? When you
desire anything, why does it not happen? When you
do not desire it, why happens it? For this is the
greatest proof of ill success and misery: "I desire
something and it does not happen; and what is more
wretched than I?" From such impatience Medea
came to murder her own children, - a lofty action in
this point of view alone, that she had a proper impression of what it was to fail of one's aim. "Thus I
shall punish him who has injured and dishonored
me; and what is so wicked a wretch good for? But
how is this to be effected? I will murder the children; but that will be punishing myself. And what
care I? " This is the error of a powerful soul. For
she knew not where the fulfilment of our desires is to
be found; that it is not to be had from without, nor by
altering the appointment of things. Do not demand
the man for your husband, and then nothing which
you desire will fail to happen. Do not desire to keep
him to yourself. Do not desire to stay at Corinth,
and, in a word, have no will but the will of God,
and who shall restrain you; who shall compel you,
any more than Zeus? When you have such a guide,
and conform your will and inclinations to his, why
need you fear being disappointed? Fix your desire
and aversion on riches or poverty; the one will be
disappointed, the other incurred. Fix them on health.
power, honors, your country, friends, children, - in
short, on anything beyond the control of your will, -
you will be unfortunate. But fix them on Zeus, on
the gods; give yourself up to these; let these govern; let your powers be ranged on the same side
with these, and how can you be any longer unprosperous? But if, poor wretch, you envy, and pity,
and are jealous, and tremble, and never cease a
single day from complaining of yourself and the
gods, why do you boast of your education? What
education, man, - that you have learned syllogisms?
Why do not you, if possible, unlearn all these, and
begin again, convinced that hitherto you have not
even touched upon the essential point? And for the
future, beginning from this foundation, proceed in order to the superstructure; that nothing may happen
which you do not wish, and that everything may
happen which you desire. Give me but one young
man who brings this intention with him to the
school, who is a champion for this point, and says,
" I yield up all the rest; it suffices me, if once I become able to pass my life free from hindrance and
grief, to stretch out my neck to all events as freely,
and to look up to Heaven as the friend of God, fearing nothing that can happen." Let any one of you
show himself of such a disposition, that I may say,
"Come into the place, young man, that is of right
your own; for you are destined to be an ornament to
philosophy. Yours are these possessions; yours these
books; yours these discourses." Then, when he has
thoroughly mastered this first class, let him come to
me again and say, "I desire indeed to be free from
passion and perturbation; but I desire too, as a
pious, a philosophic, and a diligent man, to know
what is my duty to God, to my parents, to my relations, to my country, and to strangers." Come into the second class too; for this likewise is yours.
" But I have now sufficiently studied the second class
too; and I would willingly be secure and unshaken
by error and delusion, not only when awake, but
even when asleep; when warmed with wine; when
diseased with the spleen." You are becoming as a
god, man; your aims are sublime!
"Nay; but I, for my part, desire to understand
what Chrysippus says, in his logical treatise of the
Pseudomenos."36 Go hang yourself, pitiful man,
with only such an aim as this! What good will it
do you? You will read the whole, lamenting all the
while; and say to others, trembling, "Do as I do.
Shall I read to you, my friend, and you to me?
You write amazingly well; and you very finely imitate the style of Plato; and you, of Xenophon; and
you, of Antisthenes." And thus, having related your
dreams to each other, you return again to the same
state. Your desires and aversions, your pursuits,
your intentions, your resolutions, your wishes, and
endeavors are just what they were. You do not so
much as seek for one to advise you, but are offended
when you hear such things as these, and cry, "An
ill-natured old man! He never wept over me, when
I was setting out, nor said, To what a danger are
you going to be exposed? If you come off safe,
child, I will illuminate my house. This would have
been the part of a man of feeling." Truly it will be
a mighty happiness if you do come off safe; it will
be worth while to make an illumination. For you
ought to be immortal and exempt from sickness, to
be sure.
Throwing away, then, I say, this self-conceit, by
which we fancy we have gained some knowledge of
what is useful, we should come to philosophic reasoning as we do to mathematics and music; otherwise
we shall be far from making any improvement, even
if we have read over all the compends and commentaries, not only of Chrysippus, but of Antipater, and
Archedemus too.