Ch. 9
How from the doctrine of our relationship to god we are to deduce its consequences.
If what philosophers say of the kinship between
God and men be true, what has any one to do
but, like Socrates, when he is Asked what countryman
he is, never to say that he is a citizen of Athens, or of
Corinth, but of the universe? For why, if you limit
yourself to Athens, do you not farther limit yourself
to that mere corner of Athens where your body was
brought forth? Is it not, evidently, from some larger
local tie, which comprehends, not only that comer
and your whole house, but the whole country of your
fathers, that you call yourself an Athenian, or a Corinthian? He, then, who understands the administration
of the universe, and has learned that the principal and
greatest and most comprehensive of all things is this
vast system, extending from men to God: and that
from Him the seeds of being are descended not only
to one's father or grandfather, but to all things that
are produced and born on earth; and especially to
rational natures, since they alone are qualified to partake of a communication with the Deity, being connected with him by reason, - why may not such a one
call himself a citizen of the universe ! Why not a son
of God? And why shall he fear any thing that happens among men? Shall kinship to Caesar, or any
other of the great at Rome, enable a man to live secure, above contempt, and void of all fear whatever;
and shall not the having God for our maker, and
father, and guardian, free us from griefs and alarms?
"But wherewithal shall I be fed? For I have
nothing."
To what do fugitive slaves trust when they run
away from their masters? Is it to their estates, -
their servants,- their plate? To nothing but themselves. Yet they do not fail to obtain the necessaries
of life. And must a philosopher, think you, leave his
own abode to rest and rely upon others, and not take
care of himself? Must he be more helpless and
anxious than the brute beasts? -each of which is self-sufficient, and wants neither proper food nor any suitable and natural provision. One would think that
you would need an instructor, not to guard you from
thinking too meanly or ignobly of yourselves, but
that his business would be to rear up young men of
such a spirit that, knowing their affinity to the gods,
and that we are as it were fettered by the body and
its possessions, and by so many other things as are thus
made needful for the daily pursuits of life, they should
resolve to throw them all off, as both troublesome and
useless, and depart to their divine kindred.
This is the work, if any, that ought to employ your
master and preceptor if you had one, that you should
come to him and say: " Epictetus, we can no longer
bear being tied down to this poor body, - feeding, and
resting, and cleaning it, and vexed with so many low
cares on its account. Are not these things indifferent, and nothing to us, and death no evil? Are we
not of kindred to God; and did we not come from
him? Suffer us to go back thither from whence we
came. Suffer us at length to be delivered from these
fetters that bind and weigh us down. Here thieves
and robbers, courts and tyrants, claim power over us,
through the body and its possessions. Suffer us to
show them that they have no power."
And in this case it would be my part to answer:
"My friends, wait for God, till he shall give the signal
and dismiss you from this service; then return to
him. For the present, be content to remain at this
post where he has placed you. The time of your
abode here is short and easy to such as are disposed
like you; for what tyrant, what robber, what thief, or
what court can be formidable to those who thus count
for nothing the body and its possessions. Stay, nor
foolishly depart."
Thus ought the case to stand between a preceptor
and ingenuous young men. But how stands it now?
The preceptor has no life in him, and you have
none. When you have had enough to-day, you sit
weeping about to-morrow, in regard to how you shall
get food. Why, if you have it, slave, you will have
it; if not, you will go out of life. The door is open,
why do you lament; what room remains for tears;
what occasion for flattery? Why should any one
person envy another? Why should he be impressed
with awe by those who have great possessions, or are
placed in high rank, - especially, if they are powerful
and passionate? For what can they do to us? The
things which they can do, we do not regard; the
things about which we are concerned, they cannot
reach. Who, then, after all, shall hold sway over a
person thus disposed? How behaved Socrates in regard to these things? As it became one conscious
of kinship with the gods. He said to his judges:--
If you should tell me, ' We will acquit you upon
condition that you shall no longer discourse in the
manner you have hitherto done, nor make any disturbance among either our young or our old people,'
I would answer: ' You are ridiculous in thinking that
if your general had placed me in any post I ought
to maintain and defend it, and choose to die a thousand times, rather than desert it, but that if God has
assigned me any station or method of life, I ought to
desert that for you.'
This it is for a man to truly recognize his relationship with God, But we habitually think of ourselves
as [made up of] mere stomach and intestines and
bodily parts. Because we fear, because we desire, we
flatter those who can help us in these matters; we
dread them too.
A person desired me once to write for him to
Rome. He was one vulgarly esteemed unfortunate,
as he had been formerly illustrious and rich, and was
afterwards stripped of all his possessions, and reduced
to live here. I wrote for him in a submissive style;
but after reading my letter he returned it to me and
said: "I wanted your assistance, not your pity; for
no evil has befallen me."
Thus Rufus, to try me, used to say, " This or that
you will have from your master." When I answered
him, "These are mere human affairs," "Why, then,"
says he, " should I intercede with him,17 when you can
receive from yourself things more important?" For
what one has of his own, it is superfluous and vain to
receive from another. Shall I, then, who can receive
nobleness and a manly spirit from myself, receive an
estate, or a sum of money, or a place, from you?
Heaven forbid! I will not be so insensible of my
own possessions. But if a person is fearful and abject,
what else is necessary but to apply for permission to
bury him as if he were dead? " Please forward to us
the corpse of such a one." For, in fact, such a one is
that, and nothing more. If he were anything more,
he would be sensible that man is not to be made
miserable at the will of his fellow-man.