Ch. 19
Concerning those who embrace philosophy only in words.
The science of "the ruling argument"39 appears
to have its rise from hence. Of the following
propositions, any two imply a contradiction to the
third. They are these: "That everything past is
necessarily true;" "that an impossibility is not the
consequence of a possibility;" and, "that something is a possibility, which neither is nor will be
true." Diodorus, perceiving this contradiction, combined the first two, to prove that nothing is possible,
which neither is nor will be true. Some again hold
the second and third,-"that something is possible,
which neither is nor will be true;" and "that an
impossibility is not the consequence of a possibility; "
and consequently assert, "that not everything past
is necessarily true." This way Cleanthes and his
followers took; whom Antipater copiously defends.
Others, lastly, maintain the first and third,-"that
something is possible; which neither is nor will be
true;" and "that everything past is necessarily
true; " but then, "that an impossibility may be the
consequence of a possibility." But all these three
propositions cannot be at once maintained, because
of their mutual contradiction.
If any one should ask me, then, which of them I
maintain, I answer him, that really I cannot tell.
But I have heard it related that Diodorus held one
opinion about them; the followers of Panthaedes, I
think, and Cleanthes, another; and Chrysippus a
third.
"What then is your opinion? "
I express none. I was born to examine things as
they appear to my own mind; to compare what is
said by others, and thence to form some conviction
of my own on any topic. Of these things I have
merely technical knowledge. Who was the father
of Hector? Priam. Who were his brothers? Paris
and Deiphobus. Who was his mother? Hecuba.
this I have heard related. From whom? Homer.
But I believe Hellanicus, and other authors, have
written on the same subject. And what better account have I of "the ruling argument"? But, if I
were vain enough, I might, especially at some entertainment, astonish all the company by an enumeration
of authors relating to it. Chrysippus has written
wonderfully, in his first Book of Possibilities. Cleanthes and Archedemus have each written separately
on this subject. Antipater too has written, not only
in his Treatise of Possibilities, but especially in a discourse on "the ruling argument." Have you not
read the work? "No." Read it then. And what
good will it do him? He will be more trifling and
impertinent than he is already. For what else have
you gained by reading it? What conviction have
you formed upon this subject? But you tell us of
Helen, and Priam, and the isle of Calypso, something which never was, nor ever will be. And in
these matters, indeed, it is of no great consequence
if you retain the story, without forming any principle of your own. But we commit this error much
more in dealing with moral questions, than upon such
subjects as these.
" Talk to me concerning good and evil."
Hear: -
Winds blew from Ilium to Ciconian shores. Homer, Odyssey, ix. 39.
The expression became proverbial, signifying " from bad to worse." - H.
Some things are good, some evil, and some indifferent. Now the good are the virtues, and whatever
partakes of them; and the evil are vices, and what
partakes of vice; the indifferent lie between these,
as riches, health, life, death, pleasure, pain.
"Whence do you know this?"
[Suppose I say] Hellanicus says it, in his Egyptian History. For what does it signify, whether one
quotes the history of Hellanicus, or the ethics of
Diogenes, or Chrysippus, or Cleanthes? Have you
then examined any of these things, and formed convictions of your own? How, for instance, would you
conduct yourself on shipboard? Remember these
distinctions, when the mast rattles, and some idle
fellow stands by you while you are screaming, and
says: " For heaven's sake ! talk as you did a little
while ago. Is it vice to suffer shipwreck; or does
it partake of vice?" Would you not take up a log,
and throw it at his head? "What have we to do
with you, sir? We are perishing, and you come and
jest." Again, if Caesar should summon you to answer an accusation, remember these distinctions. If,
when you are going in, pale and trembling, any one
should meet you and say, "Why do you tremble, sir?
What is this affair you are engaged in? Does Caesar,
within there, give virtue and vice to those who approach him?" "What, do you too insult me, and
add to my evils?" "Nay, but tell me, philosopher, why you tremble. Is there any other danger, but death, or a prison, or bodily pain, or exile,
or slander?" "Why, what else should there be?"
"Are any of these vice; or do they partake of vice?
What, then, did you yourself use to say of these
things? " "What have you to do with me, sir?
My own evils are enough for me." You say rightly.
Your own evils are indeed enough for you; your
baseness, your cowardice, and that arrogance by
which you were elated, as you sat in the schools.
Why did you assume plumage not your own? Why
did you call yourself a Stoic?
Observe yourselves thus in your actions, and you
will find of what sect you are. You will find that
most of you are Epicureans; a few are Peripatetics,
and those but loose ones. For by what action will
you prove that you think virtue equal, and even superior, to all other things? Show me a Stoic, if you have
one. Where? Or how should you? You can show,
indeed, a thousand who repeat the Stoic reasonings.
But do they repeat the Epicurean less well? Are
they not just as perfect in the Peripatetic? Who then
is a Stoic? As we call that a Phidian statue which
is formed according to the art of Phidias, so show
me some one person formed according to the principles which he professes. Show me one who is sick,
and happy; in danger, and happy; dying, and happy;
exiled, and happy; disgraced, and happy. Show him
to me; for, by Heaven ! I long to see a Stoic. But
you have not one fully developed? Show me then
one who is developing; one who is approaching towards this character. Do me this favor. Do not refuse an old man a sight which he has never yet seen.
Do you suppose that you are to show the Zeus or
Athena of Phidias, a work of ivory or gold? Let any
of you show me a human soul desiring to be in unity
with God; not to accuse either God or man; not to
be disappointed of its desire, nor incur its aversion;
not to be angry; not to be envious; not to be jealous;
in a word, desiring from a man to become a god;
and, in this poor mortal body, aiming to have fellowship with Zeus. Show him to me. But you cannot.
Why then do you impose upon yourselves, and play
tricks with others? Why do you put on a dress not
your own, and walk about in it, mere thieves and
pilferers of names and things which do not belong to
you? I am now your preceptor, and you come to be
instructed by me. And indeed my aim is to secure
you from being restrained, compelled, hindered; to
make you free, prosperous, happy; looking to God
upon every occasion, great or small. And you come
to learn and study these things. Why then do you
not finish your work, if you have the proper aims,
and I, besides the aim, the proper qualifications?
What is wanting? When I see an artificer, and the
materials lying ready, I await the work. Now here
is the artificer; here are the materials; what is it we
want? Is not the thing capable of being taught? It
is. Is it not in our own power, then? The only thing
of all others that is so. Neither riches nor health
nor fame nor, in short, anything else is in our power
except a right use of the semblances of things. This
alone is, by nature, not subject to restraint, not subject to hindrance. Why then do not you finish it?
Tell me the cause. It must be my fault, or yours, or
from the nature of the thing. The thing itself is practicable, and the only thing in our power. The fault
then must be either in me or in you, or, more truly,
in both. Well, then, shall we at length begin to carry
such an aim with us? Let us lay aside all that is past.
Let us begin. Only believe me, and you shall see.