Works


Works
By Epictetus
Edited by: Thomas Wentworth Higginson

New York Thomas Nelson and Sons 1890


Perseus Documents Collection Table of Contents


The Discourses of Epictetus
   Arrian to Lucius Gellius
   Of the things which are, and the things which are not in our own power.
   In what manner, upon every occasion, to preserve our character.
   How, from the doctrine that god is the father of mankind, we may proceed to its consequences.
   Of progress.
   Concerning the academics.16
   Of providence.
   Of the use of the forms of right reasoning.
   That logical subtleties are not safe to the uninstructed.
   How from the doctrine of our relationship to god we are to deduce its consequences.
   Concerning those who seek preferment at Rome.
   Of natural affection.
   Of contentment.
   How everything may be performed to the divine acceptance.
   That all things are under the divine supervision.
   What philosophy promises.
   Of providence.
   That the art of reasoning is necessary.
   That we ought not to be angry with the erring.
   Of the right treatment of tyrants.
   In what manner reason contemplates itself.
   Of the desire of admiration.
   Of general principles.
   Against Epicurus.
   How we ought to struggle with difficulties.
   On the same subject.
   What the rule of life is.
   Of the varied appearances of things to the mind, and what means are at hand by which to regulate them.
   That we ought not to be angry with mankind. What things are little, what great, among men.
   Of courage.
   Weapons ready for difficult occasions.
   That courage is not inconsistent with caution.
   Of tranquillity.
   Concerning such as recommend persons to the philosophers.
   Concerning a man who had been guilty of adultery.
   How nobleness of mind may be consistent with prudence.
   Of circumstances.25
   Of divination.
   Wherein consists the essence of good.
   That some persons, failing to fulfil what the character of a man implies, assume that of a philosopher.
   How we may infer the duties of life from its nominal functions.
   The beginning of philosophy.
   Of disputation.
   Of anxiety.
   Concerning Naso.
   Concerning those who obstinately persist in whatever they have determined.
   What we do not study to make use of the established principles concerning good and evil.
   How to apply general principles to particular cases.
   How to deal with the semblances of things.
   Concerning those who embrace philosophy only in words.
   Concerning the Epicureans and Academics.
   Of inconsistency.
   Of friendship.
   Of eloquence.
   Concerning a person whom he treated with disregard.
   That logic is necessary.
   What is the test of error.
   Of personal adornment.
   In what a well-trained man should exercise himself; and that we neglect the principal things.
   What is the chief concern of a good man; and in what we chiefly ought to train ourselves.
   Concerning one who made himself improperly conspicuous in the theatre.
   Concerning those who plead illness.
   Miscellaneous.
   Concerning a certain governor who was an epicurean.
   How we are to exercise ourselves in regard to the semblances of things.
   Concerning a certain orator, who was going to Rome on a lawsuit.
   In what manner we ought to bear illness.
   Miscellaneous.
   Of training.
   What solitude is; and what a solitary person.
   Miscellaneous.
   That everything is to be undertaken with circumspection.55
   That caution should be used, as to personal familiarity.
   Of providence.
   That we ought not to be alarmed by any news that is brought us.
   What is the comparative condition of the philosopher, and of the crowd.
   That some advantage may be gained from every outward circumstance.
   Concerning those who readily set up for sophists.
   Of the Cynic philosophy.
   Concerning such as read and dispute ostentatiously.
   That we ought not to be affected by things not in our own power.
   Concerning those who waver in their purpose.
   Concerning those who are in dread of want.
   Of freedom.
   Of complaisance.
   What things are to be exchanged for others.
   Concerning those who earnestly desire a life of repose.
   Concerning the quarrelsome and ferocious.
   Concerning those who are annoyed at being pitied.
   Of fearlessness.
   Concerning such as hastily assume the philosophic dress.
   Concerning a person who had grown immodest.
   What things we are to despise, and what chiefly to value.
   Of purity.
   Of taking pains.
   Concerning such as are too communicative

The Enchiridion

Fragments of Epictetus from Stobaeus, Antonius, and Maximus.86

Other fragments.

Doubtful fragments.

Index.
   A.
   B.
   C.
   D.
   E.
   F.
   G.
   H.
   I.
   L.
   M.
   N.
   O.
   P.
   Q.
   R.
   S.
   T.
   V.
   W.
   Z.

The Discourses of Epictetus
   Arrian to Lucius Gellius
   Of the things which are, and the things which are not in our own power.
   In what manner, upon every occasion, to preserve our character.
   How, from the doctrine that god is the father of mankind, we may proceed to its consequences.
   Of progress.
   Concerning the academics.16
   Of providence.
   Of the use of the forms of right reasoning.
   That logical subtleties are not safe to the uninstructed.
   How from the doctrine of our relationship to god we are to deduce its consequences.
   Concerning those who seek preferment at Rome.
   Of natural affection.
   Of contentment.
   How everything may be performed to the divine acceptance.
   That all things are under the divine supervision.
   What philosophy promises.
   Of providence.
   That the art of reasoning is necessary.
   That we ought not to be angry with the erring.
   Of the right treatment of tyrants.
   In what manner reason contemplates itself.
   Of the desire of admiration.
   Of general principles.
   Against Epicurus.
   How we ought to struggle with difficulties.
   On the same subject.
   What the rule of life is.
   Of the varied appearances of things to the mind, and what means are at hand by which to regulate them.
   That we ought not to be angry with mankind. What things are little, what great, among men.
   Of courage.
   Weapons ready for difficult occasions.
   That courage is not inconsistent with caution.
   Of tranquillity.
   Concerning such as recommend persons to the philosophers.
   Concerning a man who had been guilty of adultery.
   How nobleness of mind may be consistent with prudence.
   Of circumstances.25
   Of divination.
   Wherein consists the essence of good.
   That some persons, failing to fulfil what the character of a man implies, assume that of a philosopher.
   How we may infer the duties of life from its nominal functions.
   The beginning of philosophy.
   Of disputation.
   Of anxiety.
   Concerning Naso.
   Concerning those who obstinately persist in whatever they have determined.
   What we do not study to make use of the established principles concerning good and evil.
   How to apply general principles to particular cases.
   How to deal with the semblances of things.
   Concerning those who embrace philosophy only in words.
   Concerning the Epicureans and Academics.
   Of inconsistency.
   Of friendship.
   Of eloquence.
   Concerning a person whom he treated with disregard.
   That logic is necessary.
   What is the test of error.
   Of personal adornment.
   In what a well-trained man should exercise himself; and that we neglect the principal things.
   What is the chief concern of a good man; and in what we chiefly ought to train ourselves.
   Concerning one who made himself improperly conspicuous in the theatre.
   Concerning those who plead illness.
   Miscellaneous.
   Concerning a certain governor who was an epicurean.
   How we are to exercise ourselves in regard to the semblances of things.
   Concerning a certain orator, who was going to Rome on a lawsuit.
   In what manner we ought to bear illness.
   Miscellaneous.
   Of training.
   What solitude is; and what a solitary person.
   Miscellaneous.
   That everything is to be undertaken with circumspection.55
   That caution should be used, as to personal familiarity.
   Of providence.
   That we ought not to be alarmed by any news that is brought us.
   What is the comparative condition of the philosopher, and of the crowd.
   That some advantage may be gained from every outward circumstance.
   Concerning those who readily set up for sophists.
   Of the Cynic philosophy.
   Concerning such as read and dispute ostentatiously.
   That we ought not to be affected by things not in our own power.
   Concerning those who waver in their purpose.
   Concerning those who are in dread of want.
   Of freedom.
   Of complaisance.
   What things are to be exchanged for others.
   Concerning those who earnestly desire a life of repose.
   Concerning the quarrelsome and ferocious.
   Concerning those who are annoyed at being pitied.
   Of fearlessness.
   Concerning such as hastily assume the philosophic dress.
   Concerning a person who had grown immodest.
   What things we are to despise, and what chiefly to value.
   Of purity.
   Of taking pains.
   Concerning such as are too communicative

The Enchiridion

Fragments of Epictetus from Stobaeus, Antonius, and Maximus.86

Other fragments.

Doubtful fragments.

Index.
   A.
   B.
   C.
   D.
   E.
   F.
   G.
   H.
   I.
   L.
   M.
   N.
   O.
   P.
   Q.
   R.
   S.
   T.
   V.
   W.
   Z.

Funded by The Annenberg CPB/Project

The Discourses of Epictetus
 

Ch. 11

The beginning of philosophy.

The beginning of philosophy, at least to such as enter upon it in a proper way, and by the door, is a consciousness of our own weakness and inability in necessary things. For we came into the world without any natural idea of a right-angled triangle; of a diesis, or a semitone, in music; but we learn each of these things by some artistic instruction. Hence, they who do not understand them do not assume to understand them. But who ever came into the world without an innate idea of good and evil, fair and base, becoming and unbecoming, happiness and misery, proper and improper; what ought to be done, and what not to be done? Hence, we all make use of the terms, and endeavor to apply our impressions to particular cases. " Such a one hath acted well, not. well; right, not right; is unhappy, is happy; is just, is unjust." Which of us refrains from these terms? Who defers the use of them till he has learnt it, as those do who are ignorant of lines and sounds? The reason of this is, that we come instructed in some degree by nature upon these subjects; and from this beginning, we go on to add self-conceit. " For why," say you, "should I not know what fair or base is? Have I not the idea of it?" You have. "Do I not apply this idea to the particular instance? " You do. "Do I not apply it rightly, then?" Here lies the whole question; and here arises the self-conceit. Beginning from these acknowledged points, men proceed, by applying them improperly, to reach the very position most questionable. For, if they knew how to apply them also, they would be all but perfect.

If you think that you know how to apply your gen- eral principles to particular cases, tell me on what you base this application.

" Upon its seeming so to me."

But it does not seem so to another; and does not ne too think that he makes a right application?

"He does."

Is it possible, then, that each of you should rightly apply your principles, on the very subjects about which your opinions conflict?

" It is not."

Have you anything to show us, then, for this application, beyond the fact of its seeming so to you? And does a madman act any otherwise than seems to him right? Is this, then, a sufficient criterion for him too?

" It is not."

Come, therefore, to some stronger ground than seeming.

"What is that?"

The beginning of philosophy is this: the being sensible of the disagreement of men with each other; an inquiry into the cause of this disagreement; and a disapprobation and distrust of what merely seems; a careful examination into what seems, whether it seem rightly; and the discovery of some rule which shall serve like a balance, for the determination of weights; like a square, for distinguishing straight and crooked. This is the beginning of philosophy.

Is it possible that all things which seem right to all persons are so? Can things contradictory be right? We say not all things; but all that seem so to us. And why more to you than to the Syrians or Egyptians; than to me, or to any other man? Not at all more.

Therefore, what seems to each man is not sufficient to determine the reality of a thing; for even in weights and measures we are not satisfied with the bare appearance, but for everything we find some rule. And is there, then, in the present case no rule preferable to what seems? Is it possible that what is of the greatest necessity in human life should be left incapable of determination and discovery?

There must be some rule. And why do we not seek and discover it, and, when we have discovered, ever after make use of it, without fail, so as not even to move a finger without it? For this, I conceive, is what, when found, will cure those of their madness who make use of no other measure but their own perverted way of thinking. Afterwards, beginning from certain known and determinate points, we may make use of general principles, properly applied to particulars.

Thus, what is the subject that falls under our inquiry? Pleasure. Bring it to the rule. Throw it into the scale. Must good be something in which it is fit to confide, and to which we may trust? Yes. Is it fit to trust to anything unstable? No. Is pleasure, then, a stable thing? No. Take it, then, and throw it out of the scale, and drive it far distant from the place of good things.

But, if you are not quick-sighted, and one balance is insufficient, bring another. Is it fit to be elated by good? Yes. Is it fit, then, to be elated by a present pleasure? See that you do not say it is; otherwise I shall not think you so much as worthy to use a scale. Thus are things judged and weighed, when we have the rules ready. This is the part of philosophy, to examine, and fix the rules; and to make use of them, when they are known, is the business of a wise and good man.