Ch. 27
Of the varied appearances of things to the mind, and what means are at hand by which to regulate them.
Appearances to the mind are of four kinds.
Things either are what they appear to be; or
they neither are, nor appear to be; or they are, and
do not appear to be; or they are not, and yet appear
to be. Rightly to aim, in all these cases, is the wise
man's task. Whatever unduly constrains us, to that
a remedy must be applied. If the sophistries of
Pyrrhonism, or the Academy, constrain us, the remedy
must be applied there; if specious appearances, by
which things seem to be good which are not so, let us
seek for a remedy there. If it be custom which constrains us, we must endeavor to find a remedy against
that.
"What remedy is to be found against custom? "
Establish a contrary custom. You hear the vulgar
say, "Such a one, poor soul! is dead." Well, his
father died; his mother died. " Ay, but he was cut off
in the flower of his age, and in a foreign land." Observe these contrary ways of speaking; and abandon
such expressions. Oppose to one custom a contrary
custom; to sophistry the art of reasoning, and the
frequent use and exercise of it. Against specious appearances we must set clear convictions, bright and
ready for use. When death appears as an evil, we
ought immediately to remember that evils are things
to be avoided, but death is inevitable. For what can
I do, or where can I fly from it? Let me suppose
myself to be Sarpedon, the son of Jove, that I may
speak as nobly. " I go either to excel, or to give another the occasion
to excel."23 If I can achieve nothing
myself, I will not grudge another his achievement.
But suppose this to be a strain too high for us; do
not these following thoughts befit us? Whither shall
I fly from death? Show me the place, show me the
people, to whom I may have recourse, whom death
does not overtake. Show me the charm to avoid it.
If there be none, what would you have me do? I
cannot escape death; but cannot I escape the dread
of it? Must I die trembling and lamenting? For
the very origin of the disease lies in wishing for something that is not obtained. Under the influence of
this, if I can make outward things conform to my
own inclination, I do it; if not, I feel inclined to tear
out the eyes of whoever hinders me. For it is the
nature of man not to endure the being deprived of
good; not to endure the falling into evil. And so,
at last, when I can neither control events, nor tear
out the eyes of him who hinders me, I sit down, and
groan, and revile him whom I can, - Zeus, and the
rest of the gods; for what are they to me, if they
take no care of me?
"Oh ! but then you will be impious."
What then? Can I be in a worse condition than I
am now? In general, remember this, that unless we
make our religion and our treasure to consist in the
same thing, religion will always be sacrificed.
Have these things no weight? Let a Pyrrhonist,
or an Academic, come and oppose them. For my
part, I have neither leisure nor ability to stand up as
an advocate for common-sense. Even if the business
were concerning an estate, I should call in another
advocate. To what advocate, then, shall I now appeal? I will leave it to any one who may be upon
the spot. Thus, I may not be able to explain how
sensation takes place, whether it be diffused universally, or reside in a particular part; for I find perplexities in either case; but that you and I are not
the same person, I very exactly know.
"How so? "
Why, I never, when I have a mind to swallow anything, carry it to your mouth, but my own. I never,
when I wanted bread, seized a broom instead, but
went directly to the bread as I needed it. You who
deny all evidence of the senses, do you act otherwise?
Which of you, when he wished to go into a bath, ever
went into a mill?
"Why, then, must not we, to the utmost, defend
these points; stand by common-sense; be fortified
against everything that opposes it? "
Who denies that? But it must be done by him
who has ability and leisure to spare; but he who is
full of trembling and perturbation and inward disorders of heart must first employ his time about something else.