Book 2
Ch. 1
That courage is not inconsistent with caution.
There is an assertion of the philosophers which
may perhaps appear a paradox to many; yet
let us fairly examine whether it be true, - that it is
possible, in all things, to act at once with caution and
courage. For caution seems, in some measure, contrary to courage; and contraries are by no means
consistent. The appearance of a paradox in the present case seems to me to arise as follows. If indeed
we assert that courage and caution are to be used in
the same instances, we might justly be accused of
uniting contradictions; but in the way that we affirm
it, where is the absurdity? For if what has been so
often said, and so often demonstrated, be certain,
that the essence of good and evil consists in the use
of things as they appear, and that things inevitable
are not to be classed either as good or evil, what
paradox do the philosophers assert, if they say,
" Where events are inevitable, meet them with courage, but otherwise with caution "? For in these last
cases only, if evil lies in a perverted will, is caution to
be used; and if things inevitable and uncontrollable
are nothing to us, in these we are to make use of
courage. Thus we shall be at once cautious and
courageous, and, indeed, courageous on account of
this very caution; for by using caution with regard
to things really evil, we shall gain courage with
regard to what are not so.
But we are in the same condition with deer; when
these in a fright fly from the plumes [which hunters
wave], whither do they turn, and to what do they
retire for safety? To the nets. And thus they are
undone, by inverting the objects of fear and confidence. Thus we, too. When do we yield to fear?
About things inevitable. When, on the other hand,
do we behave with courage, as if there were nothing
to be dreaded? About things that might be controlled by will. To be deceived, then, or to act rashly
or imprudently, or to indulge a scandalous desire, we
treat as of no importance, in our effort to bring about
things which we cannot, after all, control. But where
death, or exile, or pain, or ignominy, is concerned,
then comes the retreat, the flutter, and the fright.
Hence, as it must be with those who err in matters
of the greatest importance, we turn what should be
courage into rashness, desperation, recklessness, effrontery; and what should be caution becomes timid,
base, and full of fears and perturbations. Let one
apply his spirit of caution to things within the reach
of his own will, then he will have the subject of avoid-
ance within his own control; but if he transfers it to
that which is inevitable, trying to shun that which he
cannot control and others can, then he must needs
fear, be harassed, and be disturbed. For it is not
death or pain that is to be dreaded, but the fear of
pain or death. Hence we commend him who says:
Death is no ill, but shamefully to die. Euripides, Fragments. - H.
Courage, then, ought to be opposed to death, and
caution to the fear of death; whereas we, on the contrary, oppose to death, flight; and to these our false
convictions concerning it, recklessness, and desperation, and assumed indifference.
Socrates used, very properly, to call these things
masks; for as masks appear shocking and formidable
to children from their inexperience, so we are thus
affected with regard to things for no other reason.
For what constitutes a child? Ignorance. What
constitutes a child? Want of instruction; for they
are our equals, so far as their degree of knowledge
permits. What is death? A mask. Turn it on the
other side and be convinced. See, it doth not bite.
This little body and spirit must be again, as once,
separated, either now or hereafter; why, then, are you
displeased if it be now? For if not now it will be
hereafter. Why? To fulfil the course of the universe; for that hath need of some things present,
others to come, and others already completed.
What is pain? A mask. Turn it and be convinced.
This weak flesh is sometimes affected by harsh,
sometimes by smooth impressions. If suffering be
beyond endurance, the door is open; till then, bear it.
It is fit that the final door should be open against all
accidents, since thus we escape all trouble.
What, then, is the fruit of these principles? What
it ought to be; the most noble, and the most suitable
to the wise, - tranquillity, security, freedom. For
in this case we are not to give credit to the many,
who say that none ought to be educated but the free;
but rather to the philosophers, who say that the wise
alone are free.
"How so?"
Thus: is freedom anything else than the power of
living as we like?
"Nothing else."
Well; tell me then, do you like to live in error?
" We do not. No one who lives in error is free."
Do you like to live in fear? Do you like to live in
sorrow? Do you like to live in perturbation?
" By no means."
No one, therefore, in a state of fear, or sorrow, or
perturbation, is free; but whoever is delivered from
sorrow, fear, and perturbation, by the same means is
delivered likewise from slavery. How shall we believe you, then, good legislators, when you say, " We
allow none to be educated but the free "? For the
philosophers say, "We allow none to be free but the
wise; " that is, God doth not allow it.
" What, then; when any person hath turned his slave
about before the consul,1 has he done nothing? "
Yes, he has.
"What? "
He has turned his slave about before the consul.
" Nothing more? "
Yes. He pays a fine for him.
"Well, then; is not the man who has gone through
this ceremony rendered free?"
Only so far as he is emancipated from perturbation.
Pray, have you, who are able to give this freedom to
others, no master of your own? Are you not a slave
to money; to a girl; to a boy; to a tyrant; to
some friend of a tyrant? Else why do you tremble when any one of these is in question? Therefore,
I so often repeat to you, let this be your study and
constant pursuit, to learn in what it is necessary to be
courageous, and in what cautious; courageous against
the inevitable, cautious so far as your will can control.
" But have I not read my essay to you? Do not
you know what I am doing?"
In what?
" In my essays."
Show me in what state you are as to desires and
aversions; whether you do not fail of what you wish,
and incur what you would avoid; but, as to these
1 The prescribed form of manumission. - H.
commonplace essays, if you are wise, you will take
them, and destroy them.
"Why? Did not Socrates write?"
Yes; who so much? But how? As he had not
always one at hand to argue against his principles,
or be argued against in his turn, he argued with and
examined himself, and always made practical application of some one great principle at least. These
are the things which a philosopher writes; but such
commonplaces as those of which I speak he leaves
to the foolish, or to the happy creatures whom idleness furnishes with leisure, or to such as are too
weak to regard consequences. And yet will you,
when opportunity offers, come forward to exhibit and
read aloud such things, and take a pride in them?
"Pray, see how I compose dialogues."
Talk not of that, man, but rather be able to say,
See how I accomplish my purposes; see how I avert
what I wish to shun. Set death before me; set pain,
a prison, disgrace, doom, and you will know me?
This should be the pride of a young man come out
from the schools. Leave the rest to others. Let no
one ever hear you waste a word upon them, nor suffer it, if any one commends you for them; but admit
that you are nobody, and that you know nothing.
Appear to know only this, never to fail nor fall. Let
others study cases, problems, and syllogisms. Do
you rather contemplate death, change, torture, exile;
and all these with courage, and reliance upon Him
who hath called you to them, and judged you worthy
a post in which you may show what reason can do
when it encounters the inevitable. And thus this
paradox ceases to be a paradox, that we must be at
once cautious and courageous; courageous against
the inevitable, and cautious when events are within
our own control.
