Ch. 23
Against Epicurus.
Even Epicurus is sensible that we are by nature
sociable beings; but having once placed our
good in the mere outward shell, he can say nothing
afterwards inconsistent with that; for again, he strenuously maintains that we ought not to admire or accept
anything separated from the nature of good, and he is
in the right to maintain it. But how, then, arise any
affectionate anxieties, unless there be such a thing as
natural affection towards our offspring? Then why
do you, Epicurus, dissuade a wise man from bringing
up children? Why are you afraid that upon their
account he may fall into anxieties? Does he fall into
any for a mouse, that feeds within his house? What
is it to him, if a little mouse bewails itself there? But
Epicurus knew that, if once a child is born, it is no
longer in our power not to love and be solicitous for
it. On the same grounds he says that a wise man
will not engage himself in public business, knowing
very well what must follow. If men are only so many
flies, why should he not engage in it?
And does he, who knows all this, dare to forbid us
to bring up children? Not even a sheep, or a wolf,
deserts its offspring; and shall man? What would
you have, that we should be as silly as sheep?
Yet even these do not desert their offspring. Or as
savage as wolves? Neither do these desert them.
Pray, who would mind you, if he saw his child fallen
upon the ground and crying? For my part, I am of
opinion that your father and another, even if they
could have foreseen that you would have been the
author of such doctrines, would not have thrown you
away.