Ch. 7
To the administrator of the free cities who was an
Epicurean.
WHEN the administrator459 came to visit him, and the man
was an Epicurean, Epictetus said, It is proper for us who
are not philosophers to inquire of you who are philoso-
phers,460 as those who come to a strange city inquire of the
citizens and those who are acquainted with it, what is
the best thing in the world, in order that we also after
inquiry may go in quest of that which is best and look
at it, as strangers do with the things in cities. For
that there are three things which relate to man, soul,
body, and things external, scarcely any man denies. It
remains for you philosophers to answer what is the
best. What shall we say to men? Is the flesh the best?
and was it for this that Maximus461 sailed as far as Cassiope in winter (or bad weather) with his son, and accompanied him that he might be gratified in the flesh?
When the man said that it was not, and added, Far be
that from him.Is it not fit then, Epictetus said, to
be actively employed about the best? It is certainly of
all things the most fit. What then do we possess which
is better than the flesh? The soul, he replied. And the
good things of the best, are they better, or the good things
of the worse? The good things of the best. And are the
good things of the best within the power of the will
or not within the power of the will? They are within
the power of the will. Is then the pleasure of the soul
a thing within the power of the will? It is, he replied.
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And on what shall this pleasure depend? On itself? But
that can not be conceived: for there must first exist a
certain substance or nature (οὐσία) of good, by obtaining
which we shall have pleasure in the soul. He assented to
this also. On what then shall we depend for this pleasure
of the soul? for if it shall depend on things of the soul,462
the substance (nature) of the good is discovered; for good
can not be one thing, and that at which we are rationally
delighted another thing; nor if that which precedes is not
good, can that which comes after be good, for in order that
the thing which comes after may be good, that which
precedes must be good. But you would not affirm this.
if you are in your right mind, for you would then say
what is inconsistent both with Epicurus and the rest of
your doctrines. It remains then that the pleasure of the
soul is in the pleasure from things of the body: and again
that those bodily things must be the things which precede
and the substance (nature) of the good.
For this reason Maximus acted foolishly if he made the
voyage for any other reason than for the sake of the flesh,
that is, for the sake of the best. And also a man acts
foolishly if he abstains from that which belongs to others,
when he is a judge (δικαστής) and able to take it. But,
if you please, let us consider this only, how this thing may
be done secretly, and safely, and so that no man will know
it. For not even does Epicurus himself declare stealing to
be bad,463 but he admits that detection is; and because it
is impossible to have security against detection, for this
reason he says, Do not steal. But I say to you that if
stealing is done cleverly and cautiously, we shall not be
detected: further also we have powerful friends in Rome
both men and women, and the Hellenes (Greeks) are weak,
and no man will venture to go up to Rome for the purpose
(of complaining). Why do you refrain from your own
good? This is senseless, foolish. But even if you tell me
that you do refrain, I will not believe you. For as it is
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impossible to assent to that which appears false, and to
turn away from that which is true, so it is impossible
to abstain from that which appears good. But wealth is
a good thing, and certainly most efficient in producing
pleasure. Why will you not acquire wealth? And why
should we not corrupt our neighbor's wife, if we can do
it without detection? and if the husband foolishly prates
about the matter, why not pitch him out of the house? If
you would be a philosopher such as you ought to be, if a
perfect philosopher, if consistent with your own doctrines,
[you must act thus]. If you would not, you will not
differ at all from us who are called Stoics; for we also say
one thing, but we do another: we talk of the things which
are beautiful (good), but we do what is base. But you
will be perverse in the contrary way, teaching what is
bad, practising what is good.464
In the name of God,465 are you thinking of a city of Epicureans? [One man says], '1 do not marry.''Nor I, for
a man ought not to marry; nor ought we to beget children,
nor engage in public matters.' What then will happen?
whence will the citizens come? who will bring them up?
who will be governor of the youth, who preside over gymnastic exercises? and in what also will the teacher instruct
them? will he teach them what the Lacedaemonians were
taught, or what the Athenians were taught? Come take a
young man, bring him up according to your doctrines. The
doctrines are bad, subversive of a state, pernicious to
families, and not becoming to women. Dismiss them, man.
You live in a chief city: it is your duty to be a magistrate,
to judge justly, to abstain from that which belongs to others;
no woman ought to seem beautiful to you except your own
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wife, and no youth, no vessel of silver, no vessel of gold
(except your own). Seek for doctrines which are consistent
with what I say, and by making them your guide you will
with pleasure abstain from things which have such per-
suasive power to lead us and overpower us. But if to the
persuasive power of these things, we also devise such a
philosophy as this which helps to push us on towards them
and strengthens us to this end, what will be the cones-
quence? In a piece of toreutic466 art which is the best part?
the silver or the workmanship? The substance of the hand
is the flesh; but the work of the hand is the principal
part (that which precedes and leads the rest). The duties
then are also three:467 those which are directed towards the
existence of a thing; those which are directed towards its
existence in a particular kind; and third, the chief or
leading things themselves. So also in man we ought not
to value the material, the poor flesh, but the principal
(leading things, τὰ προηγούμενα). What are these? Engaging
in public business, marrying, begetting children, venerat-
ing God, taking care of parents, and generally, having
desires, aversions (ἐκκλίνειν), pursuits of things and avoid-
ances, in the way in which we ought to do these things,
and according to our nature. And how are we constituted
by nature? Free, noble, modest: for what other animal
blushes? what other is capable of receiving the appearance
(the impression) of shame? and we are so constituted by
nature as to subject pleasure to these things, as a minister,
a servant, in order that it may call forth our activity, in
order that it may keep us constant in acts which are
conformable to nature.468
But I am rich and I want nothing.Why then do you
pretend to be a philosopher? Your golden and your silver
vessels are enough for you. What need have you of principles (opinions)? But I am also a judge (κριτής) of the
Greeks.Do you know how to judge? Who taught you to
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know? Caesar wrote to me a codicil.469 Let him write and
give you a commission to judge of music; and what will
be the use of it to you? Still how did you become a
judge? whose hand did you kiss? the hand of Symphorus
or Numenius? Before whose bed-chamber have you slept?470
To whom have you sent gifts? Then do you not see that
to be a judge is just of the same value as Numenius is?
But I can throw into prison any man whom I please.
So you can do with a stone.But I can beat with sticks
whom I please.So you may an ass. This is not a
governing of men. Govern us as rational animals: show
us what is profitable to us, and we will follow it: show us
what is unprofitable, and we will turn away from it.
Make us imitators of yourself, as Socrates made men imitators of himself. For he was like a governor of men, who
made them subject to him their desires, their aversion, their
movements towards an object and their turning away from
it.Do this: do not do this: if you do not obey, I will
throw you into prison.This is not governing men like
rational animals. But I (say): As Zeus has ordained, so
act: if you do not act so, you will feel the penalty, you will
be punished.What will be the punishment? Nothing
else than not having done your duty: you will lose the
character of fidelity, modesty, propriety. Do not look for
greater penalties than these.
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