Ch. 17
That the logical art is necessary.
SINCE reason is the faculty which analyses105 and perfects
the rest, and it ought itself not to be unanalysed, by what
should it be analysed? for it is plain that this should be
done either by itself or by another thing. Either then
this other thing also is reason, or something else superior
to reason; which is impossible. But if it is reason, again
who shall analyse that reason? For if that reason does
this for itself, our reason also can do it. But if we shall
require something else, the thing will go on to infinity and
have no end.106 Reason therefore is analysed by itself.
Yes: but it is more urgent to cure (our opinions107 ) and the
like. Will you then hear about those things? Hear. But
if you should say, I know not whether you are arguing
truly or falsely, and if I should express myself in any way
ambiguously, and you should say to me, Distinguish,
I will bear with you no longer, and I shall say to you, It
is more urgent.108 This is the reason, I suppose, why they
(the Stoic teachers) place the logical art first, as in the
measuring of corn we place first the examination of the
measure. But if we do not determine first what is a
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modius, and what is a balance, how shall we be able to
measure or weigh anything?
In this case then if we have not fully learned and
accurately examined the criterion of all other things, by
which the other things are learned, shall we be able to
examine accurately and to learn fully any thing else? How
is this possible? Yes; but the modius is only wood, and
a thing which produces no fruit.But it is a thing which
can measure corn.Logic also produces no fruit.As to
this indeed we shall see: but then even if a man should
grant this, it is enough that logic has the power of distinguishing and examining other things, and, as we may
say, of measuring and weighing them. Who says this?
Is it only Chrysippus, and Zeno, and Cleanthes? And
does not Antisthenes say so?109 And who is it that has
written that the examination of names is the beginning of
education? And does not Socrates say so? And of whom
does Xenophon write, that he began with the examination
of names, what each name signified?110 Is this then the
great and wondrous thing to understand or interpret Chrysippus? Who says this?What then is the wondrous
thing?To understand the will of nature. Well then do
you apprehend it yourself by your own power? and what
more have you need of? For if it is true that all men
err involuntarily, and you have learned the truth, of necessity you must act right.But in truth I do not apprehend
the will of nature. Who then tells us what it is?They
say that it is Chrysippus.I proceed, and I inquire what
this interpreter of nature says. I begin not to understand
what he says: I seek an interpreter of Chrysippus.Well,
consider how this is said, just as if it were said in the
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Roman tongue.111 What then is this superciliousness of
the interpreter?112 There is no superciliousness which can
justly be charged even to Chrysippus, if he only interprets
the will of nature, but does not follow it himself; and
much more is this so with his interpreter. For we have
no need of Chrysippus for his own sake, but in order that
we may understand nature. Nor do we need a diviner
(sacrificer) on his own account, but because we think that
through him we shall know the future and understand the
signs given by the gods; nor do we need the viscera of
animals for their own sake, but because through them
signs are given; nor do we look with wonder on the crow
or raven, but on God, who through them gives signs?113
I go then to the interpreter of these things and the
sacrificer, and I say, Inspect the viscera for me, and tell me
what signs they give. The man takes the viscera, opens
them, and interprets: Man, he says, you have a will free
by nature from hindrance and compulsion; this is written
here in the viscera. I will show you this first in the matter
of assent. Can any man hinder you from assenting to the
truth? No man can. Can any man compel you to receive
what is false? No man can. You see that in this matter
you have the faculty of the will free from hindrance, free
from compulsion, unimpeded. Well then, in the matter of
desire and pursuit of an object, is it otherwise? And what
can overcome pursuit except another pursuit? And what
can overcome desire and aversion (ἔκκλισιν) except another
desire and aversion? But, you object: If you place before
me the fear of death, you do compel me. No, it is not what
is placed before you that compels, but your opinion that it
is better to do so and so than to die. In this matter then
it is your opinion that compelled you: that is, will compelled will114 . For if God had made that part of himself,
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which he took from himself and gave to us, of such a
nature as to be hindered or compelled either by himself or
by another, he would not then be God nor would he be
taking care of us as he ought. This, says the diviner, I
find in the victims: these are the things which are signified to you. If you choose, you are free; if you choose,
you will blame no one: you will charge no one. All will
be at the same time according to your mind and the mind
of God. For the sake of this divination I go to this
diviner and to the philosopher, not admiring him for this
interpretation, but admiring the things which he interprets.
