Ch. 9
That when we cannot fulfil that which the character of a man promises, we assume the character of a philosopher.
It is no common (easy) thing to do this only, to fulfil the
promise of a man's nature. For what is a man? The
answer is, a rational and mortal being. Then by the
rational faculty from whom are we separated?274 From
wild beasts. And from what others? From sheep and
like animals. Take care then to do nothing like a wild
beast; but if you do, you have lost the character of
a man; you have not fulfilled your promise. See that
you do nothing like a sheep; but if you do, in this case
also the man is lost. What then do we do as sheep?
When we act gluttonously, when we act lewdly, when we
act rashly, filthily, inconsiderately, to what have we
declined? To sheep. What have we lost? The rational
faculty. When we act contentiously and harmfully and
passionately, and violently, to what have we declined?
To wild beasts. Consequently some of us are great wild
beasts, and others little beasts, of a bad disposition and
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small, whence we may say, Let me be eaten by a lion.275
But in all these ways the promise of a man acting as a
man is destroyed. For when is a conjunctive (complex)
proposition maintained?276 When it fulfils what its nature
promises; so that the preservation of a complex proposition is when it is a conjunction of truths. When is a
disjunctive maintained? When it fulfils what it promises.
When are flutes, a lyre, a horse, a dog, preserved? (when
they severally keep their promise). What is the wonder
then if man also in like manner is preserved, and in like
manner is lost? Each man is improved and preserved by
corresponding acts, the carpenter by acts of carpentry,
the grammarian by acts of grammar. But if a man
accustoms himself to write ungrammatically, of necessity
his art will be corrupted and destroyed. Thus modest
actions preserve the modest man, and immodest actions
destroy him: and actions of fidelity preserve the faithful
man, and the contrary actions destroy him. And on the
other hand contrary actions strengthen contrary characters: shamelessness strengthens the shameless man,
faithlessness the faithless man, abusive words the abusive
man, anger the man of an angry temper, and unequal
receiving and giving make the avaricious man more
avaricious.
For this reason philosophers admonish us not to be
satisfied with learning only, but also to add study, and
then practice.277 For we have long been accustomed to do
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contrary things, and we put in practice opinions which
are contrary to true opinions. If then we shall not also
put in practice right opinions, we shall be nothing more
than the expositors of the opinions of others. For now
who among us is not able to discourse according to the
rules of art about good and evil things (in this fashion)?
That of things some are good, and some are bad, and some
are indifferent: the good then are virtues, and the things
which participate in virtues; and the bad are the contrary; and the indifferent are wealth, health, reputation.
Then, if in the midst of our talk there should happen some
greater noise than usual, or some of those who are present
should laugh at us, we are disturbed. Philosopher, where
are the things which you were talking about? Whence
did you produce and utter them. From the lips, and
thence only. Why then do you corrupt the aids provided
by others? Why do you treat the weightiest matters as if
you were playing a game of dice? For it is one thing
to lay up bread and wine as in a storehouse, and another
thing to eat. That which has been eaten, is digested,
distributed, and is become sinews, flesh, bones, blood,
healthy colour, healthy breath. Whatever is stored up,
when you choose you can readily take and show it; but
you have no other advantage from it except so far as to
appear to possess it. For what is the difference between
explaining these doctrines and those of men who have
different opinions? Sit down now and explain according
to the rules of art the opinions of Epicurus, and perhaps
you will explain his opinions in a more useful manner
than Epicurus himself.278 Why then do you call yourself a
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Stoic? Why do you deceive the many? Why do you act
the part of a Jew,279 when you are a Greek? Do you not
see how (why) each is called a Jew, or a Syrian or an
Egyptian? and when we see a man inclining to two sides,
we are accustomed to say, This man is not a Jew, but he
acts as one. But when he has assumed the affects of one
who has been imbued with Jewish doctrine and has
adopted that sect, then he is in fact and he is named a
Jew.280 Thus we too being falsely imbued (baptized), are
in name Jews, but in fact we are something else. Our
affects (feelings) are inconsistent with our words; we are
far from practising what we say, and that of which we are
proud, as if we knew it. Thus being unable to fulfil even
what the character of a man promises, we even add to it
the profession of a philosopher, which is as heavy a burden,
as if a man who is unable to bear ten pounds should
attempt to raise the stone which Ajax281 lifted.
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