Ch. 2
In what a man ought to be exercised who has made
proficiency;441 and that we neglect the chief things.
THERE are three things (topics, τόποι) in which a man
ought to exercise himself who would be wise and good.442
The first concerns the desires and the aversions, that a
man may not fail to get what he desires, and that he may
not fall into that which he does not desire.443 The second
concerns the movements (towards an object) and the
movements from an object, and generally in doing what a
man ought to do, that he may act according to order, to
reason, and not carelessly. The third thing concerns
freedom from deception and rashness in judgment, and
generally it concerns the assents (συγκαταθέσεις). Of these
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topics the chief and the most urgent is that which relates
to the affects (τὰ πάθη, perturbations); for an affect is
produced in no other way than by a failing to obtain that
which a man desires or falling into that which a man
would wish to avoid. This is that which brings in per-
turbations, disorders, bad fortune, misfortunes, sorrows,
lamentations, and envy; that which makes men envious
and jealous; and by these causes we are unable even to
listen to the precepts of reason. The second topic con-
cerns the duties of a man; for I ought not to be free
from affects (ἀπαθῆ) like a statue, but I ought to maintain
the relations (σχέσεις) natural and acquired, as a pious
man, as a son, as a father, as a citizen.
The third topic is that which immediately concerns
those who are making proficiency, that which concerns the
security of the other two, so that not even in sleep any
appearance unexamined may surprise us, nor in intoxica-
tion, nor in melancholy. This, it may be said, is above
our power. But the present philosophers neglecting the
first topic and the second (the affects and duties), employ
themselves on the third, using sophistical arguments
(μεταπίπτοντας), making conclusions from questioning, em-
ploying hypotheses, lying. For a man must, as it is said,
when employed on these matters, take care that he is not
deceived. Who must? The wise and good man. This
then is all that is wanting to you. Have you successfully
worked out the rest? Are you free from deception in the
matter of money? If you see a beautiful girl, do you resist
the appearance? If your neighbour obtains an estate by
will, are you not vexed? Now is there nothing else
wanting to you except unchangeable firmness of mind
(ἀμεταπτωσία)? Wretch, you hear these very things with
fear and anxiety that some person may despise you, and
with inquiries about what any person may say about you.
And if a man come and tell you that in a certain conversa-
tion in which the question was, Who is the best philoso-
pher, a man who was present said that a certain person
was the chief philosopher, your little soul which was only
a finger's length stretches out to two cubits. But if
another who is present says, You are mistaken; it is not
worth while to listen to a certain person, for what does he
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know? he has only the first principles, and no more? then
you are confounded, you grow pale, you cry out immediately,
I will show him who I am, that I am a great philosopher.
It is seen by these very things: why do you wish to show
it by others? Do you not know that Diogenes pointed
out one of the sophists in this way by stretching out his
middle finger?444 And then when the man was wild with
rage, This, he said, is the certain person: I have pointed
him out to you. For a man is not shown by the finger, as
a stone or a piece of wood; but when any person shows
the man's principles, then he shows him as a man.
Let us look at your principles also. For is it not plain
that you value not at all your own will (προαίρεσις), but
you look externally to things which are independent of
your will? For instance, what will a certain person say?
and what will people think of you? will you be considered
a man of learning; have you read Chrysippus or Antipater?
for if you have read Archedemus445 also, you have every thing
[that you can desire]. Why are you still uneasy lest you
should not show us who you are? Would you let me tell
you what manner of man you have shown us that you are?
You have exhibited yourself to us as a mean fellow,
querulous, passionate, cowardly, finding fault with every
thing, blaming every body, never quiet, vain: this is what
you have exhibited to us. Go away now and read Archedemus; then if a mouse should leap down and make a
noise, you are a dead man. For such a death awaits you
as it did446 what was the man's name?Crinis; and he too
was proud, because he understood Archedemus.
Wretch, will you not dismiss these things that do not
concern you at all? These things are suitable to those
who are able to learn them without perturbation, to those
who can say: I am not subject to anger, to grief, to
envy: I am not hindered, I am not restrained. What
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remains for me? I have leisure, I am tranquil: let us
see how we must deal with sophistical arguments;447 let us
see how when a man has accepted an hypothesis he shall
not be led away to any thing absurd. To them such
things belong. To those who are happy it is appropriate
to light a fire, to dine; if they choose, both to sing and
to dance. But when the vessel is sinking, you come to
me and hoist the sails.448