Ch. 29
On constancy (or firmness).
THE being187 (nature) of the Good is a certain Will; the
being of the Bad is a certain kind of Will. What then
are externals? Materials for the Will, about which the
will being conversant shall obtain its own good or evil.
How shall it obtain the good. If it does not admire188
(overvalue) the materials; for the opinions about the
materials, if the opinions are right, make the will good:
but perverse and distorted opinions make the will bad.
God has fixed this law, and says, If you would have any
thing good, receive it from yourself. You say, No, but
I will have it from another.Do not so: but receive it
from yourself. Therefore when the tyrant threatens and
calls me, I say, Whom do you threaten? If he says,
I will put you in chains, I say, You threaten my
hands and my feet. If he says, I will cut off your
head, I reply, You threaten my head. If he says, I
will throw you into prison, I say, You threaten the
whole of this poor body. If he threatens me with
banishment, I say the same. Does he then not threaten
you at all? If I feel that all these things do not concern
me, he does not threaten me at all; but if I fear any of
them, it is I whom he threatens. Whom then do I fear?
the master of what? The master of things which are in
my own power? There is no such master. Do I fear the
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master of things which are not in my power? And what
are these things to me?
Do you philosophers then teach us to despise kings?
I hope not. Who among us teaches to claim against them
the power over things which they possess? Take my
poor body, take my property, take my reputation, take
those who are about me. If I advise any persons to claim
these things, they may truly accuse me.Yes, but I intend
to command your opinions also.And who has given you
this power? How can you conquer the opinion of another
man? By applying terror to it, he replies, I will conquer
it. Do you not know that opinion conquers itself,189 and is
not conquered by another? But nothing else can conquer
Will except the Will itself. For this reason too the law
of God is most powerful and most just, which is this: Let
the stronger always be superior to the weaker. Ten are
stronger than one. For what? For putting in chains,
for killing, for dragging whither they choose, for taking
away what a man has. The ten therefore conquer the one
in this in which they are stronger. In what then are the
ten weaker? If the one possesses right opinions and the
others do not. Well then, can the ten conquer in this
matter? How is it possible? If we were placed in the
scales, must not the heavier draw down the scale in which
it is.
How strange then that Socrates should have been so
treated by the Athenians. Slave, why do you say Socrates?
Speak of the thing as it is: how strange that the poor
body of Socrates should have been carried off and dragged
to prison by stronger men, and that any one should have
given hemlock to the poor body of Socrates, and that it
should breathe out the life. Do these things seem strange,
do they seem unjust, do you on account of these things
blame God? Had Socrates then no equivalent for these
things? Where then for him was the nature of good?
Whom shall we listen to, you or him? And what does
Socrates say? Anytus and Melitus190 can kill me, but they
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cannot hurt me: and further, he says, If it so pleases
God, so let it be.
But show me that he who has the inferior principles
overpowers him who is superior in principles. You will
never show this, nor come near showing it; for this is the
law of nature and of God that the superior shall always
overpower the inferior. In what? In that in which it is
superior. One body is stronger than another: many are
stronger than one: the thief is stronger than he who is
not a thief. This is the reason why I also lost my lamp,191
because in wakefulness the thief was superior to me. But
the man bought the lamp at this price: for a lamp he
became a thief, a faithless fellow, and like a wild beast.
This seemed to him a good bargain. Be it so. But a
man has seized me by the cloak, and is drawing me to the
public place: then others bawl out, Philosopher, what
has been the use of your opinions? see you are dragged
to prison, you are going to be beheaded. And what
system of philosophy (εἰσαγωγήν) could I have made so
that, if a stronger man should have laid hold of my cloak,
I should not be dragged off; that if ten men should have
laid hold of me and cast me into prison, I should not be
cast in? Have I learned nothing else then? I have
learned to see that every thing which happens, if it be
independent of my will, is nothing to me. I may ask, if
you have not gained by this.192 Why then do you seek
advantage in any thing else than in that in which you
have learned that advantage is?
Then sitting in prison I say: The man who cries out
in this way193 neither hears what words mean, nor understands what is said, nor does he care at all to know what
philosophers say or what they do. Let him alone.
But now he says to the prisoner, Come out from your
prison.If you have no further need of me in prison, I
come out: if you should have need of me again, I will
enter the prison.How long will you act thus?So long
as reason requires me to be with the body: but when
reason does not require this, take away the body, and fare
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you well.194 Only we must not do it inconsiderately, nor
weakly, nor for any slight reason; for, on the other hand,
God does not wish it to be done, and he has need of such
a world and such inhabitants in it.195 But if he sounds
the signal for retreat, as he did to Socrates, we must obey
him who gives the signal, as if he were a general.196
Well then, ought we to say such things to the many?
Why should we? Is it not enough for a man to be persuaded himself? When children come clapping their
hands and crying out, To-day is the good Saturnalia,197
do we say, The Saturnalia are not good? By no
means, but we clap our hands also. Do you also then,
when you are not able to make a man change his mind,
be assured that he is a child, and clap your hands with
him; and if you do not choose198 to do this, keep silent.
A man must keep this in mind; and when he is called
to any such difficulty, he should know that the time is
come for showing if he has been instructed. For he who
is come into a difficulty is like a young man from a school
who has practised the resolution of syllogisms; and if any
person proposes to him an easy syllogism, he says, rather
propose to me a syllogism which is skilfully complicated
that I may exercise myself on it. Even athletes are dissatisfied with slight young men, and say, He cannot lift
me.This is a youth of noble disposition.199 [You do
not so]; but when the time of trial is come, one of you
must weep and say, I wish that I had learned more. A
little more of what? If you did not learn these things in
order to show them in practice, why did you learn them
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I think that there is some one among you who are sitting
here, who is suffering like a woman in labour, and saying, Oh, that such a difficulty does not present itself to
me as that which has come to this man; oh, that I should
be wasting my life in a corner, when I might be crowned
at Olympia. When will any one announce to me such a
contest? Such ought to be the disposition of all of you.
Even among the gladiators of Caesar (the Emperor) there
are some who complain grievously that they are not
brought forward and matched, and they offer up prayers
to God and address themselves to their superintendents
intreating that they may fight.200 And will no one among
you show himself such? I would willingly take a voyage
[to Rome] for this purpose and see what my athlete is
doing, how he is studying his subject.201 I do not
choose such a subject, he says. Why, is it in your
power to take what subject you choose? There has been
given to you such a body as you have, such parents, such
brethren, such a country, such a place in your country:
then you come to me and say, Change my subject.
Have you not abilities which enable you to manage the
subject which has been given to you? [You ought to say]:
It is your business to propose; it is mine to exercise
myself well. However, you do not say so, but you say,
Do not propose to me such a tropic,202 but such [as I would
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choose]: do not urge against me such an objection, but
such [as I would choose]." There will be a time perhaps
when tragic actors will suppose that they are [only] masks
and buskins and the long cloak.203 I say, these things,
man, are your material and subject. Utter something
that we may know whether you are a tragic actor or a
buffoon; for both of you have all the rest in common. If
any one then should take away the tragic actor's buskins
and his mask, and introduce him on the stage as a
phantom, is the tragic actor lost, or does he still remain?
If he has voice, he still remains.
An example of another kind. Assume the governorship of a province. I assume it, and when I have assumed
it, I show how an instructed man behaves. Lay aside the
laticlave (the mark of senatorial rank), and clothing yourself in rags, come forward in this character. What then
have I not the power of displaying a good voice (that is,
of doing something that I ought to do)? How then do
you now appear (on the stage of life)? As a witness summoned by God. Come forward,204 you, and bear testimony
for me, for you are worthy to be brought forward as a
witness by me: is any thing external to the will good or
bad? do I hurt any man? have I made every man's
interest dependent on any man except himself? What
testimony do you give for God?I am in a wretched
condition, Master205 (Lord), and I am unfortunate; no man
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cares for me, no man gives me anything; all blame me, all
steak ill of me.Is this the evidence that you are going
to give, and disgrace his summons, who has conferred so
much honour on you, and thought you worthy of being
called to bear such testimony?
But suppose that he who has the power has declared,
I judge you to be impious and profane. What has happened to you? I have been judged to be impious and
profane? Nothing else? Nothing else. But if the same
person had, passed judgment on an hypothetical syllogism
(συνημμένου), and had made a declaration, the conclusion
that, if it is day, it is light, I declare to be false, what
has happened to the hypothetical syllogism? who is
judged in this case? who has been condemned? the hypothetical syllogism, or the man who has been deceived by
it? Does he then who has the power of making any declaration about you know what is pious or impious? Has
he studied it, and has he learned it? Where? From whom?
Then is it the fact that a musician pays no regard to him
who declares that the lowest206 chord in the lyre is the
highest; nor yet a geometrician, if he declares that the
lines from the centre of a circle to the circumference are
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not equal; and shall he who is really instructed pay any
regard to the uninstructed man when he pronounces
judgment on what is pious and what is impious, on what
is just and unjust? Oh, the signal wrong done by the
instructed. Did they learn this here?207
Will you not leave the small arguments (λογάρια)208 about
these matters to others, to lazy fellows, that they may sit
in a corner and receive their sorry pay, or grumble that no
one gives them any thing; and will you not come forward
and make use of what you have learned? For it is not
these small arguments that are wanted now: the writings
of the Stoics are full of them. What then is the thing
which is wanted? A man who shall apply them, one who
by his acts shall bear testimony to his words.209 Assume,
I intreat you, this character, that we may no longer use in
the schools the examples of the antients, but may have
some example of our own.
To whom then does the contemplation of these matters
(philosophical inquiries) belong? To him who has leisure,
for man is an animal that loves contemplation. But it is
shameful to contemplate these things as runaway slaves
do: we should sit, as in a theatre, free from distraction,
and listen at one time to the tragic actor, at another time
to the lute-player; and not do as slaves do. As soon as
the slave has taken his station he praises the actor210 and at
the same time looks round: then if any one calls out his
master's name, the slave is immediately frightened and
disturbed. It is shameful for philosophers thus to contemplate the works of nature. For what is a master? Man
is not the master of man; but death is, and life and plea-
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sure and pain; for if he comes without these things, bring
Caesar to me and you will see how firm I am.211 But when
he shall come with these things, thundering and lightning,212
and when I am afraid of them, what do I do then except to
recognize my master like the runaway slave? But so long
as I have any respite from these terrors, as a runaway slave
stands in the theatre, so do I: I bathe, I drink, I sing;
but all this I do with terror and uneasiness. But if I shall
release myself from my masters, that is from those things
by means of which masters are formidable, what further
trouble have I, what master have I still?
What then, ought we to publish these things to all
men? No, but we ought to accommodate ourselves to the
ignorant213 (τοῖς ἰδιώταις) and to say: This man recommends to me that which he thinks good for himself: I
excuse him. For Socrates also excused the jailor, who
had the charge of him in prison and was weeping when
Socrates was going to drink the poison, and said, How
generously he laments over us.214 Does he then say to the
jailor that for this reason we have sent away the women?
No, but he says it to his friends who were able to hear
(understand) it; and he treats the jailor as a child.
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