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HOBBES, THOMAS (b. Malmesbury, England, 5
April 1588; d. Hardwick, Derbyshire, England, 4 December
1679), political philosophy, moral philosophy,
geometry, optics.
in the independent existence of universals or absolute
ideas, or classes of things as separate entities. Human
language consists of names of things and names of
names, all joined by predicates. Names of names, or
universals, must not be confused with names of
things; universals exist in the mind and things exist
in the external world; but universals are not therefore
to be despised, because, being rooted in language,
they play their part in the reasoning process. “Truth”
for Hobbes is analytic, a product of the correct reasoning
about names.
Hobbes was uncompromising in the application of
his nominalist principles to ethics. He argued that
ethical judgments are the products of human thought
and culture. “For these words of good, evil and contemptible,
are ever used with relation to the person
that useth them: there being nothing simply and
absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil,
to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves.”
The same kind of analysis was given to the
notion of justice, which Hobbes believed to have no
independent or absolute existence. In Hobbes's view,
justice is a function of positive law, and all law is
essentially positive law. “Where there is no common
power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice.”
Justice and injustice “are qualities that relate to men
in society, not solitude,” and they draw their meaning
from the declared intentions and enforcements of the
civil magistrate.
Such a doctrine of ethical relativism and legal
positivism was profoundly offensive to orthodox
opinion in the seventeenth century; in particular, it
ran counter to traditional conceptions of natural law,
which were conceived of as laws of eternal and immutable
morality, antecedent to positive civil law,
originating, as Richard Hooker had put it, “in the
bosom of God.” Modern scholars disagree about the
meaning of Hobbes's natural law doctrine. Some
commentators, such as A. E. Taylor and Howard
Warrender, argue that certain obligations of the citizen
and all the obligations of the sovereign to his
subjects are, according to Hobbes, grounded in a
natural law antecedent to civil law; on the other
hand, Michael Oakeshott believes that all those prerogatives
of the citizen which are immune to sovereign
authority, such as the citizen's right of self-preservation,
and the obligations of the sovereign
himself, are rational, not moral, obligations. In this
view natural law is prudential. Whichever view is
correct, there can be no doubt that Hobbes cast his
natural law doctrine in a secular mold.
In the same secular spirit Hobbes developed his
ideas of human nature. Man is a part of material
nature, so his behavior, including the behavior of his
mind, can ultimately be understood by reference to
physical laws. Viewed from a shorter perspective,
human behavior is seen by Hobbes to be grounded
in self-interest, especially in the fundamental desire
to survive. Hobbes did not argue that human nature
was an entity separate from human culture, but he
asked his readers to imagine what life would be like
in the absence of culture—in the absence, that is, of
social conventions and civil restraint. This is Hobbes's
famous hypothetical picture of the “state of nature.”
Men in this condition are rapacious and predatory;
and since they are equal in the things they want and
equal in their capacities to satisfy their desires,
they live in a state of continuous warfare or, at the
very least, in a condition of fear, their lives being
then “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” The
grimness of this picture is relieved for the modern
reader by his discovery that Hobbes believed very
strongly in the doctrine of human equality; and although
Hobbes chose not to develop the democratic
implications of this doctrine, his sense of human
equality is wholly at variance with the precepts and
practices of the modern totalitarian state.
What Hobbes feared more than the tyranny of a
sovereign was anarchy, and so he constructed a
model of the state in which he thought anarchy would
be impossible. Moved by their fears and passions,
and instructed by their reason, men would come to
realize that they can be delivered from the state of
nature only by the generation of a stable commonwealth.
The process by which the state comes into
being was not intended by Hobbes to be construed
historically; in general he believed that men will
come first to recognize the significance and utility of
the “laws of nature”—or some twenty theorems of
conduct conducive to peace which Hobbes enumerated,
and which he said are summed up in the golden
rule. But at this stage these theorems of peace are
merely comprehended; what is required is the power
to enforce them, and this power resides only in a
commonwealth—and then only in its “soul,” the sovereign,
who must rule with absolute sway.
To achieve this condition of enforceable peace,
men will make a sort of contract among themselves
(but not between themselves and the sovereign) to
transfer their individual powers to a central sovereign
authority. Hobbes did not insist that the sovereign
be a single individual; although he favored monarchy,
he thought that a body of men, a parliament,
or even a king and parliament working in concert
could achieve the same results. The main point was
that the power of the sovereign be absolute, for the
slightest diminution of his power would erode the
security of the citizens; and it was for their security