Electronic edition published by Cultural Heritage Langauge Technologies (with permission from Charles Scribners and Sons) and funded by the National Science Foundation International Digital Libraries Program. This text has been proofread to a low degree of accuracy. It was converted to electronic form using data entry.
HOBBES, THOMAS (b. Malmesbury, England, 5
April 1588; d. Hardwick, Derbyshire, England, 4 December
1679), political philosophy, moral philosophy,
geometry, optics.
from each other that the sovereign was brought into
being. Hobbes reserves to the citizens the right of
rebellion if the sovereign fails to protect their security,
but he treats this question warily.
The argument of Leviathan does not end with these
views; fully one-third of the book examines the implications
of Hobbes's political philosophy in a
Christian society. Hobbes recognized that a seventeenth-century
audience would demand to know
whether his principles conformed to the teaching of
Scripture. He himself knew the Bible well, and he
was able to find passages in it supporting his doctrine
of absolute sovereignty; but other passages were inconvenient
and there remained the question, particularly
vexing in an age of religious warfare, of which
of several interpretations of Scripture was the correct
one. Ultimately, said Hobbes, all Scripture is subject
to interpretation, there being nothing about it except
its existence that is agreeable to all minds. His solution
to the problem of conflicting interpretation was
both political and philosophical. On the political side
he adopted the ultra-Erastian position that the only
interpretation of Scripture that may be publicly espoused
by citizens in a commonwealth is the interpretation
of the sovereign authority. The natural right
which citizens, by agreement among themselves, had
transferred to the sovereign included the natural right
of scriptural interpretation; should they retain that
right, the commonwealth would inevitably lapse into
a state of nature.
Moreover, Hobbes remained philosophically skeptical
about the truth of Scripture. He conceded that
a core of mystery in Scripture must be accepted on
faith; but the greater part of the Bible is immune
to human reason. His skepticism took the form of
a surprisingly modern biblical criticism in which he
anticipated Richard Simon and Spinoza by calling
in question the number, scope, authorship, and general
authenticity of the books of the Bible.
The relationship between Hobbes's scientific ideas
and outlook on the one hand and his political philosophy
on the other is hard to define. The question has
provoked disagreement among Hobbes's commentators.
Croom Robertson thought that the whole of
Hobbes's political doctrine “had its main lines fixed
when he was still a mere observer of men and manners,
and not yet a mechanical philosopher.” Leo
Strauss accepts this view, but he believes that Hobbes
had cast his mature political philosophy into an alien
scientific mold, which resulted in a distortion of the
politics but not in any significant change of its essentially
prescientific, humanistic character.
Clearly Hobbes's materialism and physics do not
imply his political theory in any simple linear connection;
but, as was pointed out by J. W. N. Watkins,
the science implies the civil philosophy in the same
way, for example, that the law of evidence has important
implications for statements made by witnesses
in law courts, although the law of evidence
does not entail any of those statements. Watkins'
treatment of this whole question is illuminating. He
has shown how Hobbes came to abandon his earliest
political views, set down in the introduction to his
Thucydides. Those views were “inductivist”; they
advocated the study of history as a guide to rational
conduct. Under the shaping influence of the new
scientific outlook, however, Hobbes adopted the
method called resolutive-compositive, which he derived
partly from Galileo, partly from Harvey, but
primarily from the philosophers and scientists of the
school of Padua. (Hobbes was personally acquainted
with a disciple of this school, Berigardus, author of
Circulus Pisanus.) The method is described by
Hobbes in De corpore. It has a large Aristotelian
component. Put in its simplest form, it consists of
resolving whole conceptions into their constituent
parts or first principles and then recomposing them.
It can be seen that this method is not an instrument
of discovery in any modern sense of the idea of “science”;
it appears to have more usefulness in social
enquiries. Hobbes assimilated it into his political
theory—as in the striking example of the break-up
of society into its constituent parts called the state
of nature and its recomposition into a commonwealth.
Not unexpectedly, Hobbes's views in Leviathan,
taken altogether, raised a storm of opposition. He was
embroiled in controversy for the rest of his life—more,
in fact, than any English thinker before or
since. The first signs of opposition appeared in France
before Leviathan was published. On the recommendation
of Newcastle, Hobbes was appointed tutor
in mathematics to the prince of Wales, the future
Charles II. Because of fears expressed by clergymen
that the prince would be contaminated with atheism,
Hobbes was obliged to promise that he would teach
mathematics only, and not politics or religion. And
when Leviathan was published, no one of the English
court in France liked it. Although it was absolutist,
it expressed no particular bias in favor of monarchy;
and it appeared to favor the Puritan regime in England
when it insisted that a citizen submit to any
government that can secure internal peace. Moreover,
its anticlericalism and attacks on the papacy
offended French Jesuits and English Catholics. For
these reasons Charles ordered Hobbes to leave the
English colony in France, and in 1652 the philosopher
returned to England.