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DESCARTES, RENÉ DU PERRON (b. La Haye,
Touraine, France, 31 March 1596; d. Stockholm,
Sweden, 11 February 1650), natural philosophy, scientific
method, mathematics, optics, mechanics, physiology.
DESCARTES: Physiology.
of the animals come about”; thus one can also explain
“how in ourselves all those operations occur which
[we] perform without any aid from the reason.”
Closely associated in the Regulae with this notion of
animal automatism was Descartes's belief that human
sensation is a two-step process consisting, first, of the
mechanical conveyance of physical stimuli from the
external organs of sense to a common sensorium
located somewhere in the body and, second, of the
internal perception of these mechanically conveyed
stimuli by a higher “spiritual” principle.
Implicit in these two notions and seeming to tie
them together is the assumption, evident in broader
compass but in as terse a formulation as elsewhere
in the Regulae, that all phenomena of the animate
and inanimate world, with the sole exception of those
directly connected with human will and consciousness,
are to be explained in terms of mathematics, matter,
configuration, and motion.
The fuller working out of his physiological ideas
occupied Descartes in the early 1630's, when he was
concerned generally with the development of his
ontological and methodological views. In 1632 he
several times referred to physiological themes and
projects in his correspondence, and in June he informed
Mersenne that he had already completed his
work on inanimate bodies but still had to finish off
“certain things touching on the nature of man.” The
allusion here was to the Traité de l'homme, which with
the Traité de lumière was meant to form Le
monde.
Along with the Traité de lumière, however, the
Traité
de l'homme was suppressed by Descartes after the
condemnation of Galileo in 1633, and although it thus
had to await posthumous publication in the 1660's,
his writing of the Traité de l'homme proved extremely
important in the further maturation of Descartes's
physiological conceptions.
The Traité de l'homme begins and ends with a
proclamation of literary and philosophical license. In
the Traité, Descartes writes, we deliberately consider
not a real man but a “statue” or machine de terre
expressly fashioned by God to approximate real men
as closely as possible. Like a real man, the machine
de terre will be imagined to possess an immaterial
soul and a physical body, and, also like a real man,
its physical body will consist of a heart, brain, stomach,
vessels, nerves, et al. But since we are considering
only an artificial man—a contrivance fashioned more
perfectly but on the same principles as a clock or
water mill—we will not be tempted to attribute the
motions and activities of this man to special sensitive
or vegetative souls or principles of life. Nothing more
than a contained rational and immaterial soul and
“the disposition of organs, no more and no less than
in the movements of a clock or any other automaton”
will be needed to comprehend the active functioning
of this special contrivance formed by God and operated
thereafter by the principles of mechanical action.
We are to bear in mind, of course, that the man of
the Traité is remarkably like men we know, but our
literary and philosophical license allows us to hypothesize
and analogize freely.
Descartes fully exercises his self-proclaimed license
in the rest of the Traité. He first surveys various
physiological
processes, giving for each of them not the
traditional or neoclassical account of such recent
physiological writers as Fernel or Riolan but mechanistic
details by which the particular function is
performed automatically in the homme. Each of
Descartes's explanations borrows something from
traditionalist physiological theories, but in each case
Descartes wields Ockham's razor to strip away excess
souls, faculties, forces, and innate heats from the
corpuscular or chemical core of explanation.
Digestion, for example, is for Descartes only a
fermentative process in which the particles of food are
broken apart and set into agitation by fluids contained
in the stomach. Chyle and excremental particles are
then separated from one another in a filtration performed
merely by a sievelike configuration of the
pores and vascular openings in the intestines. Chyle
particles go through another filtration and fermentation
in the liver, where they thereby—and only
thereby—acquire the properties of blood. Blood
formed in the liver drips from the vena cava into the
right ventricle of the heart, where the purely physical
heat implanted there quickly vaporizes the sanguinary
mass. The expansion of this sanguinary vapor pushes
out the walls of the heart and arteries. Expansion with
rarefaction is succeeded by cooling; and, as the vapor
condenses, the heart and arteries return to their original
size. The heart is fitted with a perfect arrangement
of valves, and in addition the homme is served by a
perpetual circulation of blood. (Descartes had read
William Harvey's De motu cordis, as is also clear from
his prior correspondence, but apparently took seriously
only the part on circulatory motion rather than
on cardiac action.) Cardiac and arterial pulsation
is thus continually and automatically repeated
throughout the life of the automaton by mechanical
means, not under the control of an active diastolic
faculty. And while the sanguinary particles are coursing
through the vessels, certain of them separate off
into special pores, which accounts for both nutrition
and the sievelike production of such secretions as bile
and urine.
After this mechanistic survey of general physiology,
Descartes moves to the nervous system, which he