CHAPTER VI

The Capture of Tarentum -- The Citadel holds out -- Hannibal captures Thurii -- Also Metapontum and Heraclea -- The Romans besiege Capua -- Hannibal marches to Rome -- Consternation in the City -- Flaccus follows Hannibal

Tarentum, which was held by a Roman garrison, ³¹¹ was betrayed by Cononeus in the following manner. Being in the habit of hunting and always bringing a present of game to Livius, the prefect of the guard, he became very familiar with him. As war was raging in the country he said that it was necessary to hunt and bring back his game by night. For this reason the gates were opened to him by night. He made an arrangement with Hannibal in pursuance of which he took a body of soldiers, some of whom he concealed in a thicket near the town; others he ordered to follow himself at no great distance, and still others to go with him, clad outwardly in hunting garments but girded with breastplates and swords underneath. He came by night, a wild boar being carried in front of them on poles. When the guards had opened the gates as usual, those who came with him slew the gate-men immediately. Those following behind made a sudden dash upon the other guards, those from the thicket were admitted, and the gates were opened to Hannibal. When the latter was once inside he speedily possessed himself of the remainder of the town, and having conciliated the Tarentines he laid siege to the citadel, which was held by a Roman garrison. In this way was Tarentum betrayed by Cononeus. [sect. 33]

The Romans who held the citadel were about 5000 in number, and some of the Tarentines came to their aid. The prefect of the guard at Metapontum joined them with half of his force, bringing an abundance of missiles and engines with which they expected to drive Hannibal easily back from the walls. But Hannibal had a plentiful supply of these things also. Accordingly he brought up towers, catapults, and tortoises with which he shook some of the walls, pulled off the parapets with hooks attached to ropes, and laid bare the defences. The garrison hurled stones down upon the engines and broke many of them, turned aside the hooks with slip-knots, and making frequent and sudden sallies always threw the besiegers into confusion and returned after killing many. One day when they noticed that the wind was violent some of the Romans threw down firebrands, flax, and pitch upon the engines, while others darted out and put fire under them. Hannibal, despairing of his attempt, threw a wall around the city except on the sea side, where it was not possible to do so. Then turning the siege over to Hanno he advanced into Apulia. [sect. 34]

The port of Tarentum looked toward the north and gave entrance through a narrow passage to those sailing in from the sea. The passage was now closed by bridges which were under the control of the Roman garrison, by which means they obtained provisions by sea and prevented the Tarentines from supplying themselves. For this reason the latter began to suffer from want, until Hannibal came back and suggested the making of another passage by excavating the public highway, which ran through the midst of the city from the harbor to the sea on the south. When this was done they had provisions in plenty, and with their triremes they worried the Roman garrison who had no ships, even coming close to the walls, especially in calm weather, and intercepting the supply ships coming to them. The Romans in turn began to suffer from want. When the people of Thurii sent them some ships laden with corn by night, under a convoy of triremes, the Tarentines and the Carthaginians in league with them, getting wind of the affair, laid a trap for them and captured them all, including the corn and the men that brought it. The Thurians sent numerous messengers to negotiate for the release of the captives, and the Tarentines won the negotiators over to Hannibal, who thereupon released all the Thurian prisoners he held. These, when they came home, forced their relatives to open the gates to Hanno. Thus the Thurians, while endeavoring to help the Romans in Tarentum, unexpectedly fell into the power of the Carthaginians. The Roman garrison in Thurii escaped secretly by sea to Brundusium. ³¹² [sect. 35]

The Metapontines, whose prefect had taken half of ³¹³ his force to Tarentum, slew the remainder, who were few in number, and delivered themselves up to Hannibal. Heraclea, which lay midway between Metapontum and Tarentum, followed their example, being moved by fear rather than inclination. Thus Hannibal's affairs again began to wear a flourishing aspect. In the following year some of the Lucanians revolted from Rome, and Sempronius Gracchus, the proconsul, marched against them. A certain Lucanian named Flavius, of the party that had remained faithful to the Romans, who had been also a friend and guest of Gracchus but was now his betrayer, persuaded him to come to a certain place to have a conference with the Lucanian generals, saying that they had repented and wished to return to the Roman allegiance. Suspecting nothing, he went to the place with thirty horsemen, where he found himself surrounded by a large force of Numidians in ambush, with whom Flavius then joined himself. When Gracchus discovered the treachery he leaped from his horse with his companions, and after performing many noble deeds of valor was slain with all the others, except three. These were the only ones captured by Hannibal, who had exerted himself to the utmost to take the Roman proconsul alive. Although he had basely entrapped him, nevertheless in admiration of his bravery in the final struggle he gave him a funeral and sent his bones to Rome. After this he passed the summer in Apulia and collected large supplies of corn. [sect. 36]

The Romans decided to attack the Capuans, and Hannibal sent Hanno with 1000 foot and as many horse to enter Capua by night. This he did without the knowledge of the Romans. At daylight the Romans discovered what had taken place by observing greater numbers of men on the walls. So they turned back from the city forthwith and began hurriedly to reap the harvest of the Capuans and the other inhabitants of Campania. When the Campanians bewailed their losses Hannibal said to them that he had plenty of corn in Apulia, and he gave an order that they should send and get it as often as they wished. Accordingly they sent not only their pack animals and men, but also their women and children, to bring loads of corn. They had no fear of danger on the way because Hannibal had transferred his headquarters from Apulia to Campania and was encamped on the river Calor near the country of the Beneventines, whom alone they feared as the latter were still in alliance with Rome. While Hannibal was there they despised all their enemies. ³¹⁴ [sect. 37]

It happened, however, that Hannibal was called by ³¹⁵ Hanno into Lucania, leaving the greater part of his baggage under a small guard in the camp near Beneventum. One of the two Roman consuls who were in command there (Fulvius Flaccus and Appius Claudius), learning of this, fell upon the Campanians who were bringing corn and slew many who were unprepared for an attack, and gave the corn to the Beneventines. He also took Hannibal's camp and plundered his baggage, and, as Hannibal was still in Lucania, drew a line of circumvallation around Capua. Then the two consuls built another wall outside of this and established their camp between the two. They erected battlements also, some toward the besieged Capuans and others toward the enemy outside. There was the appearance of a great city enclosing a smaller one. The space between the enclosing wall and Capua was about two stades, in which many enterprises and encounters took place each day and many single combats, as in a theatre surrounded by walls, for the bravest were continually challenging each other. A certain Capuan named Taureus having had a single combat with the Roman Claudius Asellus, and seeking to escape, retreated, Asellus pursuing till he came to the walls of Capua. The latter not being able to check his horse dashed at full speed through the gate into Capua, and galloping through the whole city, ran out at the opposite gate and rejoined the Romans, and was thus marvellously saved. ³¹⁶ [sect. 38]

Hannibal, having failed in the task that called him to ³¹⁷ Lucania, turned back to Capua, considering it very important to defend a city so large, and which had been a city of importance under Roman sway. He accordingly at-tacked their enclosing wall, but as he accomplished nothing and could devise no way to introduce either provisions or soldiers into the city, and as none of them could communicate with him on account of the closeness of the siege, he marched to Rome with his whole army, having learned that the Romans also were hard pressed by famine and hoping to draw the Roman generals away from Capua, or to accomplish something more important than its relief. Moving with the greatest celerity through the country inhabited by many hostile peoples, some of whom were not able to hinder him while others would not incur the risk of battle, he encamped at the river Anio, two and thirty stades from Rome. [sect. 39]

The city was thrown into consternation as never before. They were without any suitable force (what they had being in Campania), and now this strong, hostile army came suddenly against them under a general of invincible bravery and good fortune. Nevertheless, for the present emergency those who were able to bear arms manned the gates, the old men mounted the walls, and the women and children brought stones and missiles, while those who were in the fields flocked in all haste to the city. Confused cries, lamentations, prayers, and mutual exhortations on every side filled the air. Some went out and cut down the bridge over the river Anio. The Romans had at one time fortified a small town among the qui, which they called Alba after the name of their mother city. Its inhabitants with the lapse of time, either because of carelessness of pronunciation or corruption of language, or to distinguish them from the Albanians, were called Albenses. Two thousand of these Albenses hastened to Rome to share the danger. As soon as they arrived they armed themselves and mounted guard at the gates. Such zeal did this one small town, out of many colonies, exhibit, just as the little city of Plata came to the aid of the Athenians at Marathon and shared their danger. [sect. 40]

Appius, one of the Roman generals, remained at Capua, believing that he could capture the place by him-self. Fulvius Flaccus, the other one, marched with untiring haste by other roads and encamped opposite Hannibal, with the river Anio flowing between them. When Hannibal found that the bridge had been destroyed and that Fulvius was occupying the opposite bank, he decided to go around by the sources of the stream. Fulvius moved parallel with him on the other side. Here, again, as was his custom, Hannibal devised a stratagem. He left some Numidian horse behind, who, as soon as the armies had moved off, crossed the Anio and ravaged the Roman territory until they had come very near to the city itself, and had carried consternation into it, when they rejoined Hannibal according to their orders. The latter, when he had passed around the sources of the stream, whence the road to Rome was not long, is said to have reconnoitred the city with three body-guards secretly by night, and to have observed the lack of force and the confusion prevailing. Nevertheless he went back to Capua, either because divine Providence turned him aside this time as in other instances, or because he was intimidated by the valor and fortune of the city, or because, as he said to those who urged him to attack it, he did not wish to bring the war to an end lest the Carthaginians should deprive him of his command. At any rate, the army under Fulvius was by no means a match for him. Fulvius followed him as he retreated, merely preventing him from foraging and taking care not to fall into any traps.