(Ἀννίβας, equivalent in Punic to gratia Baalis; cf. the Biblical Hanniel). (1) The son of Gisco who in B.C. 409 aided the Segestans against the Selinuntines. He took Selinus and Himera, but died in 406 while besieging Agrigentum.
(2) Son of Gisco, the commander of Lilybaeum at the close of the First Punic War. He was besieged in Agrigentum by the Romans in B.C. 262, but broke through the lines and escaped. He ravaged the coast of Italy, was defeated by Duilius (260), and failed in the defence of Sardinia (259), being soon after slain by his mutinous soldiers.
(3) Son of Hamilcar Barca (see Hamilcar), and born in B.C. 247. At the age of nine he went to Spain with his father, who, previous to his departure, took his son to the altar, and, placing his hand on the sacrifice, made him swear that he would never be a friend to the Romans. It does not appear how long Hannibal remained in Spain, but he was at a very early age associated with Hasdrubal, who succeeded his father in the command of the Carthaginian army in that country.
On the death of Hasdrubal, B.C. 221, he obtained the undivided command of the army, and quickly conquered the Olcades, Vaccaeans, Carpesians and the other Spanish tribes that had not been subdued by Hasdrubal. The inhabitants of Saguntum, alarmed at his success, sent messengers to Rome to inform the Romans of their danger. A Roman embassy was accordingly sent to Hannibal, who was passing the winter at Carthago Nova, to announce to him that the independence of Saguntum was guaranteed by a treaty between the Carthaginians and Romans (concluded B.C. 226), and that they should consider any injury done to the Saguntines as a declaration of war against themselves. Hannibal, however, paid no regard to this remonstrance. More than twenty years had elapsed since the termination of the First Punic War, during which period the Carthaginians had recovered their strength, and had obtained possession of the greater part of Spain; and now a favourable opportunity had arrived for renewing the war with the Romans. In B.C. 219, Hannibal took Saguntum (q.v.) after a siege of eight months, and employed the winter in making preparations for the invasion of Italy. He first provided for the security of Africa and Spain by leaving an army of about 16,000 men in each country. The army in Africa consisted principally of Spanish troops, and that in Spain of Africans, under the command of his brother Hasdrubal. He had already received promises of support from the Gauls who inhabited the north of Italy, and who were anxious to deliver themselves from Roman domination. Having thus made every necessary preparation, he set out from Carthago Nova, late in the spring of B.C. 218, with an army of 80,000 foot and 12,000 horse. In his march from the Iberus to the Pyrenees he was opposed by a great number of the native tribes, but these were quickly defeated, though with loss. Before crossing the Pyrenees, he left [p. 767] Hanno to secure his recent conquests with a detachment from his own army of 11,000 men. He sent back the same number of Spanish troops to their own cities, and with an army now reduced to 50,000 foot and 9000 horse he advanced to the Rhone.
Meanwhile, two Roman armies had been levied: one, commanded by the consul P. Cornelius Scipio, was intended to oppose Hannibal in Spain; and a second, under the consul T. Sempronius, was designed for the invasion of Africa. The departure of Scipio was delayed by a revolt of the Boian and Insubrian Gauls, against whom was sent the army which had been intended for the invasion of Spain, under the command of one of the praetors. Scipio was therefore obliged to remain in Rome until a new army could be raised. When the forces were ready, he sailed with them to the Rhone, and anchored at the eastern mouth of the river, being persuaded that Hannibal must still be at a considerable distance from him, as the country through which he had to march was diffi[figure in text: Hannibal. (Von Falke.)] cult, and inhabited by many warlike tribes. Hannibal, however, quickly surmounted all these obstacles, crossed the Rhone, though not without some opposition from the Gauls, and continued his march up the left bank of the river. Scipio did not arrive at the place where the Carthaginians had crossed the river till three days afterwards; and, despairing of overtaking them, he sailed back to Italy with the intention of meeting Hannibal when he should descend from the Alps. Scipio sent his brother Gnaeus into Spain, with the greater part of the troops, to oppose Hasdrubal. Hannibal continued his march up the Rhone till he came to the Isara. Marching along that river, he crossed the Alps, descended into the valley of the Dora Baltea, and followed the course of the river till he arrived in the territories of the Insubrian Gauls. See Troger, Hannibal's Zug (Innsbruck, 1878); Buchheister, Hannibal's Zug ber die Alpen (Hamburg, 1887).
Hannibal completed his march from Carthago Nova to Italy in five months, during which time he lost a great number of men, especially in his pas sage over the Alps. According to a statement engraved by his order on a column at Lacinium, in the country of the Brutii, which Polybius saw, his army was reduced to 12,000 Africans, 8000 Spaniards, and 6000 cavalry when he arrived in the territories of the Insubrian Gauls. After remaining some time in the neighborhood of the Insubrians to recruit his army, he marched south ward, and encountered P. Cornelius Scipio on the right bank of the river Ticinus. In the battle which ensued the Romans were defeated, and Scipio, with the remainder of the army, retreating along the left bank of the Po, crossed the river before Hannibal could overtake him and encamped near Placentia. He afterwards retreated more to the south, and intrenched himself strongly on the right bank of the Trebia, where he waited for the arrival of the army under the other consul, T. Sempronius. Sempronius had already crossed over into Sicily with the intention of sailing to Africa, when he was recalled to join his colleague. After the union of the two armies, Sempronius determined, against the advice of Scipio, to risk another battle. The skill and fortune of Hannibal again prevailed; the Romans were entirely defeated, and the troops who survived took refuge in the fortified cities. In consequence of these victories, the whole of Cisalpine Gaul fell into the hands of Hannibal; and the Gauls, who, on his first arrival, were prevented from joining him by the presence of Scipio's army in their country, now eagerly assisted him with both men and supplies.
In the following year, B.C. 217, the Romans made great preparations to oppose their formidable enemy. Two new armies were levied. One was posted at Arretium, under the command of the consul Flaminius, and the other at Ariminum, under the consul Servilius. Hannibal determined to attack Flaminius first. In his march southward through the swamps of the basin of the Arnus, his army suffered greatly, and he himself lost the sight of one eye. After resting his troops for a short time in the neighbourhood of Faesulae, he marched past Arretium, ravaging the country as he went, with the view of drawing on Flaminius to a battle. Flaminius, who appears to have been a rash, headstrong man, hastily followed Hannibal; and, being attacked in the basin of Lake Trasimenus, was completely defeated by the Carthaginians, who were posted on the mountains which encircle the valley. Three or four days afterwards, Hannibal cut off a detachment of Roman cavalry, amounting to 4000 men, which had been sent by Servilius to assist his colleague. Hannible appears to have entertained hopes of overthrowing the Roman dominion, and to have expected that the other States of Italy would take up arms against Rome, in order to recover their independence. To win over the affections of the Italians, he dismissed without ransom all the prisoners whom he took in battle; and, to give them an opportunity of joining his army, he marched slowly along the eastern side of the peninsula, through Umbria and Picenum, into Apulia; but he did not meet with that co-operation which he appears to have expected. After the defeat of Flaminius, Q. Fabius Maximus was appointed dictator, and a defensive system of warfare was adopted by the Romans for the rest of the year.
In the following year, B.C. 216, the Romans resolved upon another battle. An army of 80,000 [p. 768]
foot and 6000 horse was raised, which was commanded by the consuls L. Aemilius Paulus and C. Terentius Varro. The Carthaginian army now amounted to 40,000 foot and 10,000 horse. Both armies were encamped in the neighbourhood of Cannae in Apulia. In the battle which was fought near this place, the Romans were defeated with dreadful carnage, and with a loss which, as stated by Polybius, is quite incredible; the whole of the infantry engaged in battle, amounting to 70,000, was destroyed, with the exception of 3000 men, who escaped to the neighbouring cities, and also all the cavalry, with the exception of 300 belonging to the allies and 70 that escaped with Varro. A detachment of 10,000 foot, which had been sent to surprise the Carthaginian camp, was obliged to surrender as prisoners. The consul L. Aemilius and the two consuls of the former year, Servilius and Attilius, were also among the slain. Hannibal lost only 4000 Gauls, 1500 Africans and Spaniards, and 200 horse. This vietory placed the whole of Lower Italy in the power of Hannibal, but it was not followed by such important results as might have been expected. Capua and most of the cities of Campania espoused his cause, but the majority of the Italian States continued true to Rome. The defensive system was now strictly adopted by the Romans, and Hannibal was unable to make any active exertions for the further conquest of Italy till he received a reenforcement of troops. He was in hopes of obtaining support from Philip of Macedon and from the Syracusans, with both of whom he formed an alliance; but the Romans found means to keep Philip employed in Greece, and Syracuse was besieged and taken by Marcellus, B.C. 214-12. In addition to this, Capua was taken by the Romans, B.C. 211. Hannibal was therefore obliged to depend upon the Carthaginians for help, and Hasdrubal was accordingly ordered to march from Spain to his assistance. Gnaeus Scipio, as already observed, had been left in Spain to oppose Hasdrubal. He was afterwards joined by P. Cornelius Scipio, and the war was carried on with various success for many years, till at length the Roman army was entirely defeated by Hasdrubal, B.C. 212. Both the Scipios fell in the battle. Hasdrubal was now preparing to join his brother, but was prevented by the arrival of the young P. Cornelius Scipio in Spain, B.C. 210, who quickly recovered what the Romans had lost. In B.C. 210 he took Carthago Nova; and it was not till B.C. 207, when the Carthaginians had lost almost all their dominions in Spain, that Hasdrubal set out to join his brother in Italy. He crossed the Alps without meeting with any opposition from the Gauls, and arrived at Placentia before the Romans were aware that he had entered Italy. After besieging this town without success, he continued his march southward; but, before he could effect a junction with Hannibal, he was attacked by the consuls C. Claudius Nero and M. Livius, on the banks of the Metaurus in Umbria; his army was cut to pieces, and he himself fell in the battle. This misfortune obliged Hannibal to act on the defensive; and from this time till his departure from Italy in B.C. 203, he was confined to Bruttium; but, by his superior military skill, he maintained his army in a hostile country without any assistance from his government at home. After effecting the conquest of Spain, Scipio passed over into Africa to carry the war into the enemy's country, B.C. 204. With the assistance of Masinissa, a Numidian prince, he gained two victories over the Carthaginians, who hastily recalled their great commander from Italy to defend his native State. Hannibal landed at Septis, and advanced upon Zama, five days' journey from Carthage towards the west. Here he was entirely defeated by Scipio, B.C. 202; 20,000 Carthaginians fell in the battle, and an equal number were taken prisoners. The Carthaginians were obliged to sue for peace, and thus ended the Second Punic War, B.C. 201. See Zama.
After the conclusion of the war, Hannibal vigorously applied himself to correct the abuses which existed in the Carthaginian government. He reduced the power of the perpetual judges (as Livy, xxiii. 46, calls them), and provided for the proper collection of the public revenue, which had been embezzled. He was supported by the people in these reforms; but he incurred the enmity of many powerful men, who represented to the Romans that he was endeavouring to persuade his countrymen to join Antiochus, king of Syria, in a war against them. A Roman embassy was consequently sent to Carthage to demand the punishment of Hannibal as a disturber of the public peace; and Hannibal, aware that he should not be able to resist his enemies supported by the Roman power, escaped from the city and sailed to Tyre. From Tyre he went to Ephesus to join Antiochus, B.C. 196, and contributed to fix him in his determination to make war against the Romans. If Hannibal's advice as to the conduct of the war had been followed, the result of the contest might have been different; but he was only employed in a subordinate command, and had no opportunity for the exertion of his great military talents. At the conclusion of this war Hannibal was obliged to seek refuge at the court of Prusias, king of Bithynia, where he remained about five years, and on one occasion obtained a victory over Eumenes, king of Pergamus. But the Romans appear to have been uneasy so long as their once formidable enemy was alive. An embassy was sent to demand him of Prusias, who, being afraid of offending the Romans, agreed to give him up. To avoid falling into the hands of his ungenerous enemies, Hannibal destroyed himself by poison at Nicomedia in Bithynia, B.C. 183, in the sixty-fifth year of his age.
The personal character of Hannibal is known to us only from the events of his public life, and even these have not been recorded by any historian of his own country; yet we cannot read the history of these campaigns, even in the narrative of his enemies, without admiring his great abilities and courage. Polybius remarks: How wonderful is it that in the course of sixteen years, during which he maintained the war in Italy, he should never once dismiss his army from the field, and yet be able, like a good governor, to keep in subjection so great a multitude, and to confine them within the bounds of their duty, so that they never mutinied against him nor quarrelled among themselves. Though his army was composed of people of various countriesof Africans, Spaniards, Gauls, Carthaginians, Italians, and Greeksmen who had different laws, different customs, and different languages, and, in a word, nothing among them that was commonyet, so dexterous was his management that, notwithstanding [p. 769]
this great diversity, he forced all of them to acknowledge one authority, and to yield obedience to one command. And this, too, he accomplished in the midst of very varied fortune. How high as well as just an opinion must these things convey to us of his ability in war! It may be affirmed with confidence that if he had first tried his strength in the other parts of the world and had come last to attack the Romans, he could scarcely have failed in any part of his design (Polyb. iii.; vii. 8, 9; xiv. 16; Livy, xxi. 39; Nepos, Hannibal).
See Hennebert, Histoire d'Annibal (Paris, 1870- 78); Church, Carthage (London, 1886); Krumbholz, D. Alpenbergang d. Hannibal (Dresden, 1872); Maissiat, Annibal en Gaule (Paris, 1874); De Vandancourt, Hist. des Campagnes d'Annibal en Italie, 3 vols. (Milan, 1812); Perrin, La Marche d'Annibal des Pyrnes au P, with map (Paris, 1887); Dodge, Hannibal (New York, 1891); Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, vol. ii.; and the articles Cannae; Carthago; Punic Wars; Scipio.